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Abstract
We analyze the assimilation patterns of Muslim immigrants in Western countries
with a unique identification strategy. Survey and experimental data collected in France
in 2009 suggest that Muslims and rooted French are locked in a sub-optimal equilib-
rium whereby (i) rooted French exhibit taste-based discrimination against those they
are able to identify as Muslims and (ii) Muslims perceive French institutions as system-
atically discriminatory against them. This equilibrium is sustained because Muslims,
perceiving discrimination as institutionalized, are reluctant to assimilate and rooted
French, who are able to identify Muslims as such due to their lower assimilation, reveal
their distaste for Muslims.
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1 Introduction
Debate rages in European societies as to whether Muslim immigrants can ever integrate
(Caldwell (2009)). The Islamicist-inspired bombings in Spain (2004) and London (2005); the
murder of Theo van Gogh in the Netherlands in 2004 for his depiction of Muslim sexuality;
the riots in heavily-Muslim ghettoes of Paris (2005) and Stockholm (2013); the unceasing
attacks on the Dane Kurt Westergaard for his unflattering portrayal of the Muslim prophet
in a cartoon published in 2006; the legislative actions designed to ban Islamic dress in public
places (in Belgium (2010), France (2010), and the Netherlands (2012)), and to prohibit
Mosque construction in Switzerland (2009); the fervid reactions to the Muslim presence in
Europe by radical fringe groups (that might have inspired the massacre in Norway in July
2011); and the violent attacks on soldiers in Britain and France by Islamist militants in 2013,
all contribute to portray Muslims as posing a threat to Europe. One element of this threat
is cultural, raising the question of whether Muslim immigrants and their descendants will
assimilate into a common European culture. We therefore ask whether Muslims qua Muslims
in Europe indeed show lower assimilation1 and, if so, what are the forces that sustain this
deficit? These questions are urgent. Social cohesion in Europe is indeed at stake.
Evidence about the assimilation patterns of Muslim immigrants in Western countries is
mixed. Using the United Kingdom (UK) Fourth National Survey of Ethnic Minorities, Bisin,
Pattachini, Verdier and Zenou (2008, 2011a) find that attachment to the culture of origin
is higher for Muslims than for non-Muslims. For non-Muslims, this attachment attenuates
with time spent in the UK; but for Muslims, attachment is unrelated to such time (see
Dustmann (1996), Schields and Price(2002), Riphahn (2003), and van Ours and Veenman
(2003) for similar conclusions). Yet, these results are at odds with those of Manning and Roy
(2010) who, using the UK Labour Force Survey in 2001, analyze respondents’ probability
of answering “British” when asked to define their identity. They show that newly arrived
immigrants almost never think of themselves as British and that no difference exists between
Muslims and non-Muslims. Moreover, they find that the probability of reporting a British
identity increases with the time spent in the UK, at a similar rate for Muslims and for
non-Muslims (see Constant, Gataullina and Zimmermann (2009), Aleksynska (2011), and
Georgiadis and Manning (2011) for similar results showing no Muslim effect).
These mixed results may partly derive from the difficulty of isolating a religion (Islam)
1Following Constant, Gataullina and Zimmermann (2009) or Gorinas (2013), we measure the degree of
assimilation by the level of identification with ancestral homeland and with the host country.
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effect on assimilation patterns, due to possible confounds such as race, ethnicity or national-
ity. Indeed, Muslim immigrants typically migrate from Muslim countries, i.e. countries with
few non-Muslim counterparts. This is the case, for example, of North African immigrants
in France, Turkish immigrants in Germany and Pakistani and Bangladeshi immigrants in
the UK. These confounds make it difficult to obtain a clean comparison for any European
state, holding constant the country of origin, between the assimilation patterns of Muslim
and non-Muslim immigrants.
The objective of this paper is twofold. First, we want to compare the assimilation pat-
terns, on average and over time, of Muslim and non-Muslim immigrants without running
into identification problems. We focus on France, which is home to the largest Muslim
community in Western Europe both in absolute numbers (an estimated 4.7 million in 2010)
and as a percentage of its population (an estimated 7.5% in 2010) according to the Pew
Research Center (2011). To isolate a Muslim effect, we cannot study the principal Mus-
lim immigrant group in France, viz. North Africans, as there is no matched set of North
African Christians to whom North African Muslims could be compared. We focus instead on
two ethno-linguistic groups originating in Senegal, the Joolas and the Serers. These ethno-
linguistic groups are divided by religion, with one portion of them being Muslim and another
portion being Christian. With the exception of religion, Senegalese Muslims (hereafter SM)
and Senegalese Christians (hereafter SX) from these two ethno-linguistic groups are similar.
They share the same culture and migrated to France during the same time (during the early
1970s), due to the same push factor (extensive drought conditions). Appendix A1 develops
evidence that families from the Joola and Serer communities who converted to Christianity
in the 19th century were not different from those who converted to Islam during the same
period. Moreover, it shows that SM and SX individuals who were the first to migrate to
France after WWII were similar across key characteristics: level of education and occupation
in Senegal, as well as time of arrival to France.
To compare the assimilation patterns, on average and over time, of SM and SX, we rely on
a survey that we conducted in 2009 among a set of second- and third-generation immigrants
to France stemming from these two groups. Our results reveal that Muslim immigrants
show significantly lower assimilation (i.e., higher attachment to their culture of origin and
lower identification with the host culture and society) than do their Christian counterparts.
Furthermore, we find that assimilation levels between SM and SX do not converge over the
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time elapsed since the arrival of the first migrant to France.2
What accounts for these results? Understanding the mechanism(s) behind the persistence
of Muslims’ lower assimilation in France constitutes the second objective of this paper. To do
so, we rely on a field experiment3 we conducted in France in 2009. This experiment involves
behavioral games that bring together SM and SX players with rooted French players (i.e.,
those citizens with four grandparents born inside metropolitan France) whom we refer to
as FFF (i.e., French for at least three generations). Our games are designed to illuminate
how SM and FFF behave toward each other when unconditional altruism and trust (i.e.,
belief about others’ unconditional altruism) are at stake (as compared to the way SX and
FFF behave toward each other). Our experiment reveals that SM are less cooperative (they
show lower unconditional altruism and trust) – notably with rooted French players – than
are SX, a result that is consistent with our survey finding that SM have assimilated less
in France than have SX. Moreover, our games show that the persistence of Muslims’ lower
assimilation is consistent with Muslims and rooted French being locked in a sub-optimal
equilibrium whereby: (i) rooted French exhibit taste-based discrimination, that is they show
lower unconditional altruism (but not lower trust), toward those they are able to identify
as Muslims (due to the fact that these Muslims maintain recognizable Muslim first names);
(ii) Muslims perceive French institutions as systematically discriminatory against them (and
therefore assimilate less, although Muslims’ lower assimilation may not only be due to rooted
French discrimination).
Our findings are consistent with research in identity economics showing that if the cost of
assimilation is sufficiently high (possibly due to taste-based discrimination by the dominant
group), it becomes rational for members of the minority to eschew assimilation (see Laitin
(1995), Akerlof and Kranton (2000), Fang and Loury (2005), and Bisin, Pattachini, Verdier
and Zenou (2011c)). Consistent with these findings is the evidence on assimilation behavior
after an exogenous shock to everyday relations. For example, after the 9/11 attacks in the
U.S., hostility toward Muslims by non-Muslim Americans increased, and – relatedly – Muslim
identification with the U.S. decreased (Davila and Mora (2005) and Gould and Klor (2012)).
2For three of the eighteen items measuring assimilation, we even find that these patterns diverge: SM
lower assimilation decreases, while SX higher assimilation increases with the time spent in France.
3Technically, and relying on the taxonomy created by Harrison and List (2004), we have conducted a
“framed field experiment” since, as we shall describe, we rely on a nonstandard subject pool, and these
subjects receive an information set from the real world (the names of their game partners) that they can use
in their game participation. We also ran a follow-up experiment in 2010 that also relied on a nonstandard
subject pool that received an information set from the real world. Henceforth, for economy of expression,
we refer to both interventions as “field experiments”.
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Note that taste-based discrimination by the dominant group could induce the adoption by
the minority of an in-group norm of punishment of assimilators that further increases the cost
of assimilation. In racial relations in the U.S., in-group policing in which initial assimilators
are subject to the epithet of “acting white” deters other African-Americans from assimilating
(see Fryer and Torelli (2010) for empirical evidence of this phenomenon and Fordham and
Ogbu (1986), Fordham (1996), McWhorter (2000), Austen-Smith and Fryer (2005) and Eguia
(2012) for its rational account).
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our survey data and the
regression framework we use to analyze them. In Section 3, we present our survey results.
Section 4 describes the field experiment. Section 5 presents our experimental results. Section
6 checks for robustness. Section 7 summarizes our major conclusions and discusses their
policy implications for the assimilation of Muslim immigrants in France.
2 Survey data and regression framework
In this section, we present our survey, the questions we use to compare SM and SX as-
similation patterns in France, and the regression framework that allows us to analyze this
difference, on average and over time.
2.1 The survey
Our survey of 511 Serers and Joolas in France, both Christians and Muslims, was adminis-
tered from April to June 2009 by the professional survey firm Conseils-Sondages-Analyses
(CSA). The survey relied on a non-random sample of 332 respondents initially contacted by
linking Serer and Joola surnames with cell numbers,4 and interviewed by telephone, and 179
respondents interviewed face-to-face through a chain referral sampling procedure.
The following four eligibility criteria were used: the respondent had to: (1) be 18 to 40
years of age, (2) be born in France, (3) have at least one parent or grandparent born outside
of France, and (4) have at least one Serer or Joola-speaking grandparent.
Quotas were used to ensure better sample representativeness. Respondents represent
1.2% of the eligible population-base. We define as SM (SX) individuals who reported to be
Muslim (Christian) and to belong to a family of Muslim (Christian) tradition. Overall, 466
4To avoid bias, we did not rely on landlines, as they would tap only the wealthiest, and least typical, of
the immigrant population.
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respondents (91% of the whole sample) are classified as either SM or SX – 339 (or 73%) are
classified as SM and 127 (27%) as SX.5
2.2 Measuring assimilation patterns
We rely on two categories of questions to measure the assimilation patterns of SM and
SX. The first category, meant to capture a respondent’s strength of identification with her
ancestry, measures attachment to the respondent’s country (Senegal) or continent (Africa)
of origin. The second category captures a respondent’s strength of identification with a
now-secularized French culture and society.6
Attachment to the country or continent of origin is based on nine questions capturing:
(i) whether the respondent has ever been to Africa; (ii) whether the respondent sends remit-
tances to Africa; (iii) the degree of sympathy the respondent has toward Senegalese living in
Senegal; (iv) whether the grandparents of the respondent’s best friend originate from Senegal
or other African countries; (v) whether the association the respondent belongs to is related
to Senegal or to Africa; (vi) whether the respondent believes she shares much in common
with people of the same country of origin as her family; (vii) whether the respondent wants
to be buried in Senegal or in Africa; (viii) whether the respondent owns a home in Africa;
(ix) whether the respondent disapproves of a Senegalese student who chooses not to renounce
a scholarship in a top French university to take care of a sick mother in Senegal.
Respondent identification with French culture and society is based on seven questions
capturing: (i) the degree of sympathy the respondent has toward French people; (ii) whether
the respondent believes that immigrants should do whatever possible to avoid conflict with
the hosting society; (iii) whether the grandparents of the respondent’s best friend originate
from France; (iv) whether the respondent shows political preferences that can be positioned
on a typical left-wing/right-wing scale;7 (v) whether the respondent considers herself to share
much in common with French people; (vi) whether the respondent wants to be buried in
France; (vii) whether the respondent approves of a scenario whereby a man of Senegalese
5The sample remains disproportionately Muslim, and this is not surprising given that Senegal is more
than 90% Muslim. Our identification of two Senegalese ethnic groups with substantial numbers of Christians
is key, given the predominance of Islam in Senegal.
6Assimilation into French culture can be measured in part by the reduction in the level in which religion
infuses other aspects of life. Indeed, in the 2006 World Values Survey for France, 13% say that religion is
very important to their lives; by contrast, in the 2008 Afrobarometer survey for Senegal, 95.8% say that
religion is very important to their lives. Relying on our definition of assimilation, those who claim that
religion is less important to their lives are thus assimilating into French norms.
7Politics in Senegal do not follow a typical left-wing/right-wing scale the way they do in France. Instead,
the most common political dimensions in Senegal are region, Sufi order and cousinage (see Smith (2010)).
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origin hides from his white son’s friends so that they may believe the son is rooted French.
The strength of the respondent’s identification with the host culture and society is also
captured by the respondent’s degree of secularization. This degree of secularization is based
on six questions measuring: (i) the importance of god in the respondent’s life; (ii) whether
the respondent would disapprove of her child marrying a religious-other; (iii) the degree of
sympathy the respondent has toward people sharing the same religion; (iv) whether the best
friend of the respondent is of the same religion; (v) whether the association the respondent
belongs to is related to religion;8 (vi) whether the respondent believes she shares much in
common with people of the same religion.
2.3 The regression framework
To isolate whether SM and SX assimilation patterns differ on average, we estimate Equation
(1):
y = a+ b.SM + c.Time + d′.X+ ϵ, (1)
where y is the respondent’s answer to one of the questions above. The dummy SM is equal to
1 if the respondent is SM and to 0 if the respondent is SX. Therefore, coefficient b captures
the difference between the answer provided by SM respondents and the answer provided
by SX respondents. The variable Time is continuous and captures the number of years
elapsed since arrival of the first migrant in the respondent’s family. We also control for X, a
vector of socioeconomic characteristics of the respondent. This vector contains information
on characteristics that are either pre-treatment (i.e., they concern features of the household
before migration of the first migrant to France) or exogenous. The pre-treatment control is
the education of the first migrant. The exogenous controls are the gender and the age of
the respondent. We do not include post-treatment (i.e., post-migration) controls since those
would capture part of the “Muslim” effect and therefore bias the coefficient of the dummy
SM.
To compare the assimilation patterns of SM and SX over time, we estimate Equation (2):
y = a+ b.SM+ c.SM.Time + d.Time + e.SM.Age + f ′.X+ ϵ. (2)
The variables SM, Time and X are defined as in Equation (1). Coefficient d captures the
8Note that there is no difference in the probability of participating in an association between SM and SX.
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impact of Time on SX assimilation.9 The sum of coefficients c and d captures the impact
of Time on SM assimilation.10 Consequently, coefficient c (the coefficient of the interaction
term SM.Time) provides the difference between the evolution of SM and SX assimilation
patterns over time.
Note that one expects a positive correlation between the age of the respondent and the
number of years elapsed since arrival of the first migrant in the respondent’s family. This
intuition is confirmed by our data (this correlation is equal to 0.39 and significant at the
1% confidence level). Therefore, we also control in Equation (2) for the interaction term
SM.Age where the variable Age represents the age of the respondent, in order to ensure that
coefficient c does not partially capture an age effect.11
3 Survey results
In this section, we show (by estimating Equation (1)) that SM and SX assimilation patterns
differ on average, with SM assimilation into French culture and society significantly lower
than SX assimilation into French culture and society. We then show (by estimating Equation
(2)) that there is no convergence between SM and SX, namely that SM lower assimilation
persists over time.
3.1 Do SM and SX assimilation patterns differ on average?
The fourth column in Tables 1, 2a and 2b provides results from our estimation of coefficient
b in Equation (1) on the three sets of questions measuring the assimilation patterns of
migrants: attachment to Senegal and Africa (Table 1), identification with France (Table
2a), and secularization (Table 2b). This coefficient captures the difference in assimilation
between SM respondents and SX respondents.
The fourth column in Table 1 presents OLS estimates for the coefficient of the dummy
SM in Equation (1) over the set of questions that capture the attachment of the respondent
to Senegal and/or Africa. This coefficient is always positive. Moreover, it is almost always
9Alternatively, coefficient d could capture the fact that the first migrants in SX families systematically
differ with regard to assimilation, depending on when they arrived to France. We rule out this possibility in
the robustness checks.
10Alternatively, the sum of coefficients c and d could capture the fact that the first migrants in SM families
systematically differ with regard to assimilation, depending on when they arrived to France. We rule out
this possibility in the robustness checks.
11We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this issue to our attention.
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significant at least at the 90% confidence level. The exceptions are displayed in rows 3 and
9, which capture respectively: the degree of sympathy the respondent has toward Senegalese
living in Senegal; and whether the respondent disapproves of a Senegalese student who
chooses not to renounce a scholarship in a top French university to take care of a sick
mother in Senegal. Still, across seven of our nine indicators, our results clearly indicate that,
on average, SM respondents show significantly stronger attachment to Senegal and Africa as
compared to their Christian counterparts.12
The fourth column in table 2a presents OLS estimates for the coefficient of the dummy
SM in Equation (1) over the set of questions that capture identification with the French
culture and society, excluding secularization. This coefficient is always negative. Moreover,
it is always significant at least at the 90% confidence level. Our results clearly indicate
that, on average, the identification of SM respondents with the host culture and society is
significantly lower than the one observed among SX.13
The fourth column of table 2b presents OLS estimates for the coefficient of the dummy
SM in Equation (1) over the set of questions that capture secularization.14 This coefficient
is always positive. Moreover, it is almost always significant at least at the 90% confidence
level. The exceptions are displayed in rows 3 and 5, which capture – respectively – the
degree of sympathy the respondent has toward people sharing the same religion, as well as
whether the association the respondent belongs to is related to religion. Across four of our six
indicators, our results clearly indicate that, on average, SM respondents display significantly
less secularization as compared to their Christian counterparts.15 In sum, our results reveal
that Muslim immigrants show significantly lower assimilation (i.e., higher attachment to
their culture of origin and lower identification with the host culture and society, with -
notably - lower secularization) than do their Christian counterparts.
12Controlling for the variable Time, as well as for the respondent’s socioeconomic characteristics, substan-
tially reduces the number of observations due to missing data for these controls. However, the significance
level for the dummy SM does not change if we impute missing data (results available upon request).
13The significance level for the dummy SM does not change if we impute missing data, with the exception
of row 2 (whether the respondent believes immigrants should do whatever possible to avoid conflict with the
hosting society) where the dummy SM loses significance (results available upon request).
14Given the coding of our measures of secularization, a positive coefficient indicates less secularization.
15The significance level for the dummy SM does not change if we impute missing data, with the exception
of row 3 (the degree of sympathy of the respondent toward people sharing the same religion) where the
dummy SM becomes significant (results available upon request).
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3.2 How does the difference in assimilation patterns between SM
and SX evolve over time?
In Table 3, we estimate coefficient c in Equation (2), that is, whether assimilation patterns
of SM and SX change over time. We restrict our attention to assimilation outcomes that saw
a significant SM effect in Tables 1 through 2b. Our results show that the coefficient of the
interaction term SM.Time is almost never significant, suggesting that SM do not catch up
with matched SX respondents over time. Moreover, in the three instances (out of eighteen
dependent variables) where the coefficient of the interaction term SM.Time reaches statistical
significance, the effect indicates divergence, not convergence, in SM and SX assimilation over
time. We elaborate on these results below.
In Table 3, Panel A presents OLS estimates for coefficient c in Equation (2) over the set of
questions that capture respondent attachment to Senegal and Africa. This coefficient is not
significant in column 1 and in columns 3 through 6, indicating that higher SM attachment
and lower SX attachment to their country/continent of origin do not change over time.16
Note, however, that this coefficient is positive and significant in columns 2 and 7 (whether the
respondent sends remittances and whether the respondent owns a home in Africa), indicating
a divergence between SM and SX over time. More specifically, SM are more likely – while
SX are less likely – to send remittances and to own a home in Africa over time.
In table 3, Panel B presents OLS estimates for coefficient c in Equation (2) over the
set of questions that capture identification with French host culture and society excluding
secularization. This coefficient is never significant, indicating that SM lower identification
and SX higher identification with French culture and society do not converge over time.17
In Table 3, Panel C presents OLS estimates for coefficient c in Equation (2) over the set of
questions that capture secularization. This coefficient is not significant in columns 2 through
4, indicating that higher SM attachment and lower SX attachment to their religion-of-origin
persist over time. Note that this coefficient is positive and significant in column 1, indicating
a divergence between SM and SX over time regarding the importance they attach to god.
More specifically, this importance increases over time for SM, while it decreases over time
for SX.18 Overall, our analysis shows that SM and SX assimilation patterns do not converge,
16These results hold when we impute missing data, with the exception of column (6) where the positive
coefficient of the interaction term SM.Time becomes significant (i.e., SM and SX attachment to Senegal and
Africa diverges over time). More precisely, the desire to be buried in Senegal or in Africa increases over time
for SM, while it decreases over time for SX (results available upon request).
17These results hold when we impute missing data (results available upon request).
18These results hold when we impute missing data (results available upon request).
9
and in some cases diverge, over time.
Note that selection in the first migrant-type would lead us to measure only a biased
causal effect of the duration of stay on SM and SX assimilation. More precisely, the first
migrants in the families of our SM and SX respondents might systematically differ with
regard to patterns of assimilation, depending on when they arrived to France. If so, then
the persistent divergence in assimilation levels between SM and SX over time could be due
not only to the impact of time spent in France, but also to differences in assimilation levels
at the time of initial migration. We address this issue in the robustness checks and find no
empirical support for selection among the first migrants.
3.3 Discussion of our identification strategy
Our results reveal that Muslim immigrants show significantly lower assimilation (i.e., higher
attachment to their culture of origin and lower identification with the host culture and
society, with - notably - lower secularization) than do their Christian counterparts. Moreover,
they show that this difference does not decrease with the time immigrants spend in France.
Given our identification strategy, ours is the first analysis to identify a specific Muslim effect
on immigrant assimilation in France.
One may wonder however whether our results are not merely driven by differences that
exist between SM and SX in Senegal, rather than by differences between SM and SX experi-
ences in France.19 Notably, SX are a minority while SM are a majority in Senegal. Thus, it
could be that SM are assimilating in France just fine, but that SX had such a difficult time
in Senegal that their assimilation in France is superior to that of the SM. The success of
Jews from Russia to the U.S. or Maronites from Lebanon to Europe is consistent with this
interpretation, although the selection issue (in which oppressed minorities with ambition are
more likely to emigrate than majority group members with similar ambition) prevents us
from drawing any causal inference from these examples. Yet, continued religious harmony
in Senegal (Mecham (2006)) as well as similar economic outcomes between SM and SX in
Senegal before migration (see Appendix A1) suggests that SX are not an oppressed minority
there.
Still, the simple fact of belonging to a minority in the country of origin may sharpen
one’s adaptation skills even if this minority is not oppressed, by forcing one to adapt to the
majority culture. The ideal identification strategy would therefore have consisted in studying
19We thank an anonymous referee for bringing this issue to our attention.
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immigrants in France from a country in which the two religions are evenly matched. Yet,
we have not found a sizeable immigrant community in France that fits this description, and
which has been established for a sufficiently long time to allow us to study the evolution
of its assimilation pattern. It is worthwhile noting however that Adida, Laitin and Valfort
(2013) provide evidence suggesting that our results are not simply driven by a “minority
effect”. Relying on the European Social Survey, these authors compare the integration
pattern in Western European countries of Muslim and Christian immigrants from Bosnia
and Herzegovina, the only country worldwide were the share of Christians and Muslims is
almost equal.20 Even in this context – where Christians are not a religious minority in their
country of origin – Christians report significantly less discrimination in Western European
host countries than do their Muslim counterparts.
4 Experimental set up
The second objective of this paper is to understand the mechanisms underlying the per-
sistence of lower assimilation of Senegalese Muslims in France. To do so, we rely on field
experiments that we conducted in France in 2009 (the same year we collected our survey
data) and in 2010. The 2009 field experiment brings together rooted French (FFF), SM and
SX in the context of behavioral games. In this section, we first present our 2009 subject
pool. We then describe our 2009 games, designed to allow us to examine how SM and FFF
(relative to SX and FFF) behave toward each other with regard to unconditional altruism
and trust (i.e., belief about others’ unconditional altruism). Finally, we explain, based on
the 2010 field experiment, how we identify that FFF condition their behavior specifically
on the Muslimness of our players, rather than on some other factor, i.e. the foreignness of
players’ names.
4.1 The 2009 subject pool
In March 2009, we set up a series of experimental games among FFF, SM and SX. For
those games, we recruited 27 Senegalese players: 16 self-identified as Muslims (SM) and 11
as Christians (SX).21 We relied upon three separate networks to recruit these Senegalese
20According to the 2009 Report on International Religious Freedom by the US Department of State, 97%
of the population in Bosnia and Herzegovina is either Christian or Muslim. Muslims stand for 46.5% of this
population (while Christians account for 53.5%).
21Our subjects are coded by religious self-identification or, when that information is missing, ascribed
religious heritage based on the advice of an ethnographer with expertise on Senegalese culture, who served
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players. Two of the networks came from the ethnographers who were conducting family
histories for our wider research project, and who were asked to recruit subjects by merely
telling them they had heard about experiments with a chance to earn a lot of money. No
mention was to be made about Senegalese specificity or religion. The third network came
from a Senegalese night watchman (not from the Joola or Serer communities) who worked
at a student dorm. He was given a quota for the SM and SX and paid for each recruit who
showed up for registration and participated in the games. Here again, no mention was to be
made about Senegalese specificity or religion. Table 4 presents the results of a difference of
means test comparing the socioeconomic characteristics of our SM and SX participants. SM
and SX do not differ on critical characteristics such as gender, age, education or household
income. The only characteristic on which they differ is religiosity, with SX being significantly
more religious than SM. This introduces a bias we treat in our regressions by controlling for
the socioeconomic characteristics of SM and SX players and notably for their religiosity.22
It is important to emphasize that African Muslims are less spontaneously associated with
Islam in the French collective imagination because they know little to no Arabic and interact
indiscriminately with African Muslims and African non-Muslims (Diop (1988)). Any evi-
dence of FFF discrimination against SM should thus be interpreted as a lower bound on the
magnitude of FFF anti-Muslim discrimination: levels of discrimination against Maghrebis,
the Muslims who are at the center of public debates about the role of Islam in France, would
almost certainly be higher (had there been a way to identify a Muslim effect from a Maghrebi
immigrant sample in France) than those we find for Senegalese Muslims.
To complement our game sessions, we also recruited 53 non-Senegalese players. The
ethno-religious breakdown of these 53 non-Senegalese players was as follows: 29 players,
among whom 21 were FFF, were of European background; 12 players were of sub-Saharan
African background; and 12 players were of North African background.
We recruited these players in the ethnically diverse setting of the 19th district of Paris.23
For our experiments to be unbiased, we could not give players the impression that we wanted
to know if they were conditioning their moves on the religious backgrounds of our Senegalese
players, and therefore needed to conduct the experiments in a setting in which the Senegalese
on our research team.
22Note that this bias, if anything, runs against us finding FFF discrimination against SM since SM
participants are more moderate in their religious practices.
23According to the 1999 French census, the percentage of individuals living in this district who are born
in France is 63.5 (against 82.4 for all of Paris). A good picture of the diversity in the 19th district is offered
in the French film “Entre les murs” (“The Class” in its English-language version) that received the Palme
d’Or at the 2008 Cannes Film Festival.
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players would not appear to be exceptional. The 19th district, with its high levels of national,
ethnic and religious diversity, offered a solution that worked: in the exit surveys for the
experiments, only one subject speculated that religion had anything to do with the purposes
of the games,24 and only one Senegalese player out of a total 27 verbally wondered if there
was something odd about having other players in the room from his Senegalese language
group.
We used a stratified (by population density) but not always fully random recruitment
procedure centered on the 21 metro stations of the 19th district. In a fully random protocol,
we assigned a weight to each metro station based on the density of the area in which it
is located, with the higher density stations getting more cards in our random draw. Each
recruitment team drew a metro station for each recruitment day, and then a number from
1 to 10 to determine which passer-by to invite as a game recruit. But because we wanted
to ensure a large number of interactions between our SX/SM sample and FFF, we deviated
from this protocol to assure ourselves a sufficient number of FFF players. When potential
subjects who looked as if they were FFF walked by, recruiters were instructed to ignore the
sequence of selection, and to ask them to participate in our experiment. Passers-by who
were willing to hear our appeal were told that they could win up to 148 euros for about two
and a half hours of game participation,25 games which were designed to investigate “how
people from Ile-de-France [Parisian region] make decisions about money.”
Turn-downs were about 30 percent, introducing some bias that likely leads to an over-
representation of individuals favorable to diversity among our sample (relative to a random
sample of game participants). Indeed, those individuals who agreed to participate in our
experiments were told that they would interact with others from the Ile-de-France region, a
region commonly known to be ethnically and religiously diverse. We can test this intuition
for FFF players. To do so, we compare the average political ideology of our FFF sample to
that of a random sample of rooted French from the 2009 European Social Survey (“ESS”
henceforth). We use a question that measures where respondents stand on a left-wing/right-
wing scale, capturing a tendency to support social change versus a tendency to preserve
traditional values. One’s position on a left wing-right wing scale therefore reveals, among
other things, attitudes toward diversity. In order to obtain a comparable group of rooted
French respondents in our experiment and in the ESS, we selected a sub-sample of ESS re-
24In the exit questionnaire, we asked: “Que pensez-vous que notre e´quipe aura appris sur vous a` travers
vos de´cisions aujourd’hui?” [What do you think our team will have learned about you from the decisions
you made today?]
25This stands for roughly 8.5 times the hourly minimum wage in France in 2009.
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spondents who were born in France and whose parents were born in France. Unfortunately,
the ESS does not provide information about the birthplace of the respondents’ grandpar-
ents. We thus cannot exclude ESS respondents with one or more grandparents born abroad:
our sample of rooted French respondents from the ESS is thus, if anything, more open to
diversity than would be a sample of rooted French respondents with four grandparents born
in metropolitan France (the definition of FFF for our experimental games). This bias thus
runs against us finding any difference between our FFF players and the rooted French re-
spondents in the ESS, since we hypothesize that the latter are more open to diversity than a
random sample of FFF. Table 5 presents the results of a difference of means analysis between
our FFF and the ESS rooted French. It shows that our FFF sample is, on average, more
left-wing than the random sample of rooted French respondents in the 2009 ESS (significant
at the 99% confidence level). These results are confirmed by an OLS analysis reported in
Table 6. In this table, the variable “European Social Survey” takes the value 1 if the indi-
vidual is a respondent in the 2009 ESS and 0 if she is a participant in our 2009 experiment.
The coefficient for this variable is always positive and highly significant, whether one con-
trols for the gender (column 2), age (column 3), education (column 4) or household income
(column 5) of the individual. We therefore have confirmation that FFF participants in our
2009 experiments are more open to diversity compared to a representative sample of FFF in
France that same year. As a consequence, our results suffer from a bias that again leads to
an underestimation of anti-Muslim discrimination on the part of FFF.
4.2 The 2009 games
The 2009 field experiment comprised two phases: a registration phase, during which we
collected demographic and behavioral data that we later used for the composition of the
player-sets;26 and a game phase, during which subjects played a series of experimental games.
We supervised eight sessions of games of 10 players each held in a rented private language
school in the 19th district in Paris, over the course of two weekends, on Friday evenings
after work and on Sunday. Three of the sessions were all male; three of the sessions were all
26At registration, we collected demographic data from participants, potentially priming them about iden-
tity issues, and thereby biasing our results. This is unlikely, however, given that at least two weeks separated
the registration and game phases. Moreover, as explained in the text, what we told the players about our
games and where we held the sessions served to downplay any suggestion that religious identities had any
role in our intervention. The success of this strategy was revealed in our exit questionnaires, which asked
participants what they thought our team had learned about them throughout the games: only 1 respondent
out of a total 80 mentioned religion.
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female; and two of the sessions were mixed gender.
When subjects arrived at a game session, they were given a code number. They were then
told that since they would be interacting with strangers for the next few hours, interactions
would be more personal if they wrote their first names on a label and pasted that label on
their chests. All subjects complied without question or concern. The only information players
had about each other was therefore their looks, their manners, their dress and their first
names. None wore any clothes or jewelry revealing religious affiliation, with the exception of
one non-Senegalese player, who wore a headscarf signaling a Muslim identity. After check-in
was completed, they were brought to an open room with the other players, given magazines
to read, and monitored in a way that discouraged any conversation or interaction.
4.2.1 The sequencing of the games
The session was comprised of five experimental games which were all designed to examine
how SM and FFF interact with one another (relative to SX and FFF): (i) a simultaneous
trust game; (ii) a speed chatting game; (iii) a voting game; (iv) a dictator game; and (v) a
strategic dictator game.27
In the following we describe and present evidence from the first of those games, the
simultaneous trust game, which was the only game to take place before the socialization of
players with one another (via the speed-chatting game). We also briefly refer to the results
stemming from the other games (described in Appendix A2) to show that they are consistent
with those obtained from the simultaneous trust game.
Note that the sequencing of our games raises a potential concern with contamination
effects of previous games on players’ behavior during the subsequent games, especially if
players learned about other players’ game decisions once they were allowed to interact and
communicate freely (during the speed-chatting game). Such contamination is highly unlikely
however. During our initial presentation of the experiments to the players, we emphasized
that all game decisions would remain anonymous and private at all times. Moreover, in our
instructions for the speed chatting game, we stressed that players were to get to know – in
27Throughout the session, and out of sight from the players, monitors kept a full account of all answers
and earnings for each player. At the end of the session, as players answered an exit survey, the winnings
for each player were placed in sealed envelopes for them to take home. Full protocols (in French, but with
English translations) are available upon request. Here we review only what is necessary for interpreting
the results presented in the subsequent section. We take this opportunity to thank our six recruiters and
monitors for their incredible hard work, intellectual contributions throughout, and dedication to the project:
Mathieu Couttenier, Jacinto Cuvi Escobar, Karine Marazyan, Etienne Smith, Josselin Thuilliez and Se´verine
Toussaert.
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French “faire connaissance avec” – their speed-chatting partners, meaning that players were
instructed to find out information about who their partners were outside of the lab, not
what their partners did during the game. Finally, we instructed all players to keep notes of
their speed-chatting conversations. In these notes, there is no evidence that game-behavior
information was exchanged during the speed-chatting game.
4.2.2 The simultaneous trust game
The 2009 simultaneous trust game was the first game participants played in our experimental
set-up. In this game, subjects sat quietly in a waiting room (they were supervised such that
they could not communicate with one another), and were called to a table in pairs. For each
pair, one player was assigned the role of “sender” and the other “receiver”. The pairs were
created to ensure that all FFF in a session played the simultaneous trust game twice with
each Senegalese player in that session, once for each role. Sender was allotted 3 euros in
her account, and could send any amount {0, 1, 2, 3} to receiver (an amount that was known
by the players to be tripled) by marking this amount on a sheet that receiver would never
see. Receiver simultaneously marked on a sheet the sender would never see what percentage
{0, 1/3, 2/3, 1}28 of the amount received would be sent back to the sender.29 After each play,
the senders and the receivers returned to the waiting room, not knowing if they would be
called again, or in what role.
The amount sent by the sender in the trust game is commonly considered by experimental
economists as a sign of trust that Cox (2004) defines as being “inherently a matter of the
beliefs that one agent has about the behavior of another” (Cox (2004): 263). In other words,
the amount sent by the sender in the trust game captures the sender’s belief that the receiver
will be generous to her. However, the amount sent by the sender has also been shown to
partially capture unconditional altruism, that is the sender’s willingness to be generous to
28In order to avoid the equal split option from becoming a focal point in this game (Schelling (1960)), we
did not offer it.
29The novelty of our simultaneous trust game with respect to the original trust game introduced by Berg,
Dickhaut and McCabe (1995) is in the simultaneity of the decisions made by the sender and by the receiver.
We preferred the simultaneous trust game over the original trust game for several reasons. Our objective
was to treat each trust game played by our subjects as a one-shot game in order to mimic everyday life
random encounters between strangers. It was therefore critical to avoid any reputation effect that would
have occurred if receivers learned how much particular senders had sent in previous games. This procedure
also brings a touch of realism since most interactions in real life happen under incomplete information.
In this respect, removing sequentiality in the decision process looks less artificial. Furthermore, since our
protocol introduced a socialization phase after the simultaneous trust game, in which players would get to
know each other, we did not want their conversations to be biased by knowledge of their partners’ actions
during the simultaneous trust game.
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the receiver irrespective of what the receiver does (Fershtman and Gneezy (2001), Camerer
(2003), Cox (2004) and Ashraf, Bohnet and Piankov (2006)).30 As for the amount sent back
by the receiver in the simultaneous trust game, it is most plausibly interpreted as a signal
of unconditional altruism and/or belief-based reciprocal altruism (i.e., an altruistic behavior
based on the receiver’s belief that the sender is being kind to her, keeping in mind that the
actions of the sender and of the receiver are simultaneous).31
Put differently, the simultaneous trust game offers the advantage of capturing the two
common types of discrimination, taste-based and statistical discrimination, on the side of
both the sender and the receiver. More precisely, differences in unconditional altruism by
the sender and/or the receiver should reveal taste-based discrimination. According to Becker
(1957), taste-based discrimination indeed results from the “special disutility” which a player
attaches to contact with another player (see Arrow (1998)). By contrast, differences in trust
on the side of the sender and/or differences in belief-based reciprocal altruism on the side
of the receiver should reveal statistical discrimination. Following Arrow (1972), statistical
discrimination would indeed result from the negative belief which a player holds about the
ability of another player to be kind to her.32 Although our simultaneous trust game, in
itself, cannot distinguish between taste-based versus statistical discrimination, we exploit
information from our other games to identify which one is at stake in our players’ decisions.
4.3 Disentangling FFF response to SM Muslimness from FFF re-
sponse to SM foreignness
Since SX and SM players were indistinguishable to FFF players in terms of dress and ap-
pearance, the only observable signals differentiating our Senegalese players were their first
names, which were written on a label pasted on their chests. The names of our SM and SX
players are listed in Table 7. As should be apparent, all the SX had names that are from the
Christian Bible (and which are common French names), but none of the Muslim players did.
From the point of view of the FFF, therefore, the SX had French names. However, the SM
all had foreign names, some of them sounding Muslim, others sounding more African. This
30A third possible confound of positive transfers by the sender in the trust game is risk aversion. Yet, risk
aversion hasn’t been shown to be a serious confounding factor. For instance, Eckel and Wilson (2004) do
not find behavioral risk measures to be significantly correlated with the decision to send in the trust game.
They conclude that “subjects do not see trust as a problem of risk” (Eckel and Wilson (2004): 464).
31See Trivers (1971) on the role that reciprocal altruism plays in cooperation.
32Originally, Arrow introduced statistical discrimination to account for employers discriminating racially
when they believe that the unobserved determinants of performance are correlated with race, which is
observable (Arrow (1998): 96).
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raises a question: did SM and SX first names adequately signal their religious affiliation, or
might they have signaled something else, such as foreignness? It is critical to test whether
FFF behavior toward SM is a response to SM Muslimness or to SM foreignness.
To distinguish between these two possibilities, we recruited 50 FFF players from the 19th
district in 2010 to participate, among other things, in a field experiment asking subjects to
guess the ethnic and religious affiliations of names. We contracted the professional survey
firm CSA to recruit respondents with addresses in the 19th district, and they did so relying
on the phone directory. The sample was non-random, since it depended on the agreement
of individuals who were called to participate in the experiment, but through quotas on
neighborhood (quartier), gender, and age we guarded against systematic bias with respect
to critical observable characteristics.33 Respondents were invited to register if and only if
they reported that all four grandparents were born within France’s continental boundaries,
thereby qualifying as rooted French. The average age of players was 40, ranging from 20 to
59. Twenty-seven were female, and twenty-three were male. The games took place in an
office building in the nearby 18th district, and were administered by computer, in groups of
five. Each player sat in front of a computer without interacting with any of the other four
players who were all sitting in front of their monitors.
The 50 FFF participants in our 2010 experiments played a Names Game allowing us
to address whether the FFF in our 2009 experiments were responding more to the religion
of their fellow players’ first names or to their foreignness. FFF players were presented,
sequentially, a series of names among which the names of our 2009 SM and SX players. For
purposes of expediency, a random half of FFF players were shown half of SM and SX players’
first names; the other half were shown the rest. For each name, FFF players were asked to
guess the religious heritage of the person in question (Christian, Muslim, Buddhist, Jewish,
Hindu, Animist). Figure 1 illustrates a sample screenshot of the Names Game. The 2010
Names Game informs us that SX were unambiguously identified as Christians, consistent
with the fact that they had names that are from the Christian Bible (and which are common
French names). However, SM were not unambiguously characterized as Muslims. More
precisely, the Names Game allowed us to compute, for each SM first name, the percentage
33Recall that we find that our sample of rooted French players in 2009 is more left-wing in political
ideology than is the ESS sample of rooted French, suggesting that our sample is more open to diversity than
the average rooted French. We do not have a 2010 ESS to conduct such an analysis for our 2010 sample
of rooted French players. However, our 2010 sample of rooted French players was recruited from the same
district as our 2009 sample, and was introduced to the games in the exact same manner. It is therefore likely
that the direction of the bias in 2010 is the same as the one we found in 2009.
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of FFF who identified it as a “Muslim” name. Based on this information, we created two
subgroups among SM: SMM (“Senegalese Muslims with Muslim names”) were those whose
first names were guessed as “Muslim” by more than 50% of the FFF answering that question;
SMA (“Senegalese Muslims with African names”) were the remaining SM. Table 8 shows
that only those with first names of Arabic origin were considered as Muslims (SMM).34
By contrast, the remaining SM (SMA) were considered as Christians or affiliated to more
traditional religions like Animism.35
5 Are SM and FFF locked in a sub-optimal equilib-
rium?
In the following, we first show that our games reveal a pattern – viz. SM are less cooperative
than are SX throughout our experimental games – that is consistent with the lower assimi-
lation levels we have identified for SM (relative to SX) in our survey. We then suggest that
this lower assimilation (and its persistence, as documented in our survey data) is consistent
with Muslims and rooted French being locked in a sub-optimal equilibrium whereby: (i)
rooted French exhibit taste-based discrimination against those they are able to identify as
Muslims (due to the fact that these Muslims keep recognizable Muslim first names instead
of adopting French-sounding names); (ii) Muslims perceive French institutions as system-
atically discriminatory against them (and therefore assimilate less, many retaining Muslim
first names). To be sure, Muslims’ lower assimilation may not only be due to rooted French
discrimination. More precisely, no active discrimination by rooted French is necessary to
explain that, upon arrival to France, SM show lower assimilation than do SX. Due to their
religion, SX are indeed culturally closer to a Christian-heritage host country like France than
are SM. Assimilating in France should therefore be an easier process for SX than for SM.
However, if this is the story, then convergence between SM and SX assimilation should occur
over time. The fact that this is not the case suggests that an additional barrier, possibly the
discrimination of SM by rooted French, is at stake.
34Only two of the eleven SM with first names of Arabic origin were not characterized as “Muslim” by a
majority of FFF (these first names are Ibou and Sidy). Similarly, only one of the seven SM with first names
not of Arabic origin were characterized as “Muslim” by a majority of FFF (this first name is Ndeye).
35And indeed, although the bulk of Serers and Joolas have converted to Islam or Christianity, many of
them continue to follow traditional beliefs (see Berg and Ruth (2009)).
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5.1 Experimental evidence of assimilation patterns among SM
and SX
Our survey results clearly indicate that SM are more attached to their country of origin and
less attached to the host culture and society than are SX in France, this difference persisting
over time. If our games are consistent with this pattern, we expect SM players to be less
cooperative (i.e., to show lower unconditional altruism and trust) toward their game partners
in France than are SX.
To test this implication, we use data from the simultaneous trust game to estimate
Equation (3):
y = a+ b.(FFF → SM) + c.(SX → All) + d.(SM → All) + e′.X+ f ′.Z+ g′.Π+ ϵ. (3)
The dependent variable y refers to the amount sent by the sender to the receiver if we
focus on the sender’s behavior, and to the amount sent back by the receiver to the sender if
we focus on the receiver’s behavior. The dummy (FFF → SM) is equal to 1 if player 1 is FFF
and player 2 is SM and to 0 otherwise.36 The dummy (SM → All) is equal to 1 if player 1 is
SM and player 2 is any of the players with which player 1 was matched, and to 0 otherwise.
The dummy (SX → All) is equal to 1 if player 1 is SX and player 2 is any of the players
with which player 1 was matched, and to 0 otherwise. The reference category is the dummy
(FFF → SX) that is equal to 1 if player 1 is FFF and player 2 is SX and to 0 otherwise.
Consequently, the difference between coefficients d and c captures the difference between
the behavior of SM player 1 and the behavior of SX player 1 toward their game partners.
Put differently, this difference allows us to test whether SM hold back in their donations as
sender or receiver as compared to SX. Moreover, coefficient b captures the difference between
the behavior of FFF player 1 toward SM player 2 and the behavior of FFF player 1 toward
SX player 2. We rely on this information when we tackle the next section dedicated to
whether FFF players 1 discriminate against SM players 2 (as compared to SX players 2).
Equation (3) also controls for the socioeconomic characteristics of players 1 and 2 (gender,
age, household income, education, religiosity and whether the player knows players who
participated in previous game sessions) that are denoted by X and Z respectively. Finally,
36Player 1 is the sender when we analyze the amount sent and the receiver when we analyze the amount
sent back. Player 2 is the receiver when we analyze the amount sent and the sender when we analyze the
amount sent back. In Equation (3), we not only focus on the behavior of SM and SX toward their game
partners, but also on the behavior of FFF toward SM and SX. This is because we rely on Equation (3) in
the following section to test whether FFF discriminate against SM in the simultaneous trust game.
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we introduce Π, a vector of session fixed effects. Note that standard errors are clustered at
the player 1 level, since different game decisions by the same player 1 cannot be considered
independent of one another.
That SM senders are significantly less cooperative toward all game partners is shown
on Table 9. Columns 1, 3, 5 and 7 present OLS estimates from four model specifications of
Equation (3), restricting our attention to the amount sent in the simultaneous trust game. In
column 1, we control for the ethnic identity of the sender and of the receiver only. In column
3, we add session fixed effects. In column 5, we include the socio-demographic characteristics
of the sender and of the receiver. Since this inclusion generates a reduction in the sample size
from 178 to 134 observations due to missing values for the income, education and religiosity
of some of the senders and receivers, we run a multiple imputation analysis in column 7.
The last Wald test at the bottom of Table 9 shows that the difference between coefficients
d (in row (5)) and c (in row (4)) is significant in the most complete specifications presented
in columns 5 and 7.37
Results are the same, as revealed in Table 10 (columns 1, 3, 5 and 7), when we restrict
our attention to the amount sent back in the simultaneous trust game. Here, with OLS
estimates from four model specifications of Equation (3), controls are introduced stepwise,
as in Table 9. Again, since the inclusion of the socio-demographic characteristics of the
sender and receiver generates a reduction in the sample size from 166 to 129 observations
due to missing values, we run a multiple imputation analysis in column 7. The last Wald test
at the bottom of Table 10 again shows that the difference between coefficients d (in row (5))
and c (in row (4)) is significant in the most complete specifications presented in columns 5
and 7, showing that SM receivers send back significantly less to their game partners than do
SX receivers. In sum, the results from the 2009 simultaneous trust game, revealing that SM
are outliers among our 19th district players, are consistent with those of our survey, which
indicate that SM are less assimilated in France than are SX. It is important to emphasize
that we observe the same pattern in the games that followed the socialization phase (via
the speed-chatting game): SM allocate significantly less as leaders in a voting game (where
elected group leaders distributed a 30-euro prize between themselves and their arbitrarily-
designated electors) than do SX, and SM give significantly less as donors in the subsequent
dictator game than do SX (results available upon request).
37We ignore columns 2, 4, 6 and 8 for now, which are analyzed in Section 5.2.1
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5.2 Do FFF discriminate against SM and why?
In this section, we uncover one reason why SM assimilate less than do SX in France. Specif-
ically, we investigate FFF discrimination against SM, and whether such discrimination is
taste-based, statistical, or both.
5.2.1 Do FFF discriminate against SM?
We analyze the potential discriminatory behavior of our players in the simultaneous trust
game by relying on Equation (3) and Equation (4) which introduces the distinction between
SM with recognizable Muslim names (i.e., SMM) and SM without recognizable Muslim
names (i.e., SMA):
y = a+ b.(FFF → SMM) + c.(FFF → SMA)
+d.(SX → All) + e.(SM → All)
+f ′.X+ g′.Z+ h′.Π+ ϵ. (4)
The dummy (FFF → SMM) is equal to 1 if player 1 is FFF and player 2 is SMM and
to 0 otherwise. The dummy (FFF → SMA) is equal to 1 if player 1 is FFF and player 2 is
SMA and to 0 otherwise. The reference category is again the dummy (FFF → SX), equal
to 1 if player 1 is FFF and player 2 is SX and to 0 otherwise. As a consequence, coefficient
b captures the difference between the behavior of FFF player 1 toward SMM player 2 and
the behavior of FFF player 1 toward SX player 2. In other words, it tells us whether rooted
French discriminate against Muslims with recognizable Muslim names relative to otherwise-
matched Christians. Coefficient c captures the difference between the behavior of FFF player
1 toward SMA player 2 and the behavior of FFF player 1 toward SX player 2. In other words,
it tells us whether rooted French discriminate against Muslims without recognizable Muslim
names relative to otherwise-matched Christians. Put differently, coefficients b and c allow us
to test whether FFF player 1’s discrimination against SM player 2 (if it exists) is a reaction
to SM players 2’s Muslimness or foreignness. Vectors X, Z and Π are defined as in Equation
(3).
Table 9 presents OLS estimates for Equation (3) (Models 1, 3, 5 and 7) and Equation
(4) (Models 2, 4, 6 and 8), restricting our attention only to senders. The coefficient in row
(1), columns 1, 3, 5, and 7 shows that the amount sent by FFF senders to SM receivers is
lower than the amount sent by FFF senders to SX receivers, although never significantly so
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(see the p-value of the Wald test “(1)=0” at the bottom of Table 9). The coefficients in rows
(2) and (3), columns 2, 4, 6, and 8 allow us to extend this conclusion to the cases where
we distinguish between SMM and SMA receivers (see the p-value of the Wald test “(2)=0”
and “(3)=0” at the bottom of Table 9). The OLS analysis therefore cannot disconfirm the
null hypothesis that FFF send equally to SX and SM, even those with recognizable Muslim
names.
What happens when FFF act as receivers in the simultaneous trust game? Table 10
presents OLS estimates for Equation (3) (Models 1, 3, 5 and 7) and Equation (4) (Models 2,
4, 6 and 8), restricting our attention only to receivers. The coefficient in row (1), columns
1, 3, 5, and 7 shows that the amount sent back by FFF receivers to SM senders is lower
(and significantly so in the most complete specifications) than the amount sent back by FFF
receivers to SX senders. Moreover, the coefficients in rows (2) and (3), columns 2, 4, 6, and 8
reveal that the significantly lower amount sent back by FFF receivers to SM senders is driven
by FFF discrimination against SMM, not by FFF discrimination against SMA (see the p-
value of the Wald test “(2)=0” and “(3)=0” at the bottom of Table 10). The OLS analysis
therefore uncovers that FFF receivers discriminate against SM, and more precisely against
SMM. It is important to stress that the non significant difference between the amounts sent
back by FFF receivers to SMA and SX senders is not due to the low number of observations
associated with those interactions. A difference of means analysis (not shown, but available
upon request) indeed reveals that FFF receivers return exactly the same proportion of the
amount they receive to SMA and SX senders (i.e., 48% on average). By contrast, FFF
receivers return only an average 33% of the amount they receive to SMM senders.
Although the results from the 2009 simultaneous trust game reveal FFF anti-Muslim
discrimination, it is important to emphasize that a different pattern is observed in the games
following the socialization afforded by the speed-chatting game: FFF voters are not less likely
to vote for a SM than for a SX leader, FFF leaders do not allocate less to SM than to SX
voters, and FFF dictators do not give less to SM than to SX recipients (results available
upon request). Put differently, we find that FFF a priori discriminate against SM (and more
precisely against those they are able to identify as Muslims) but that they stop doing so after
a basic conversation with their SM game partners. Note however that this finding no longer
holds once the number of SM and SX in the game session increases. More precisely, Adida,
Laitin and Valfort (2012b) show that, even after the socialization phase, FFF anti-Muslim
discrimination is reactivated when the proportion of SM in the game session rises. The
23
discrimination-reducing effect of socialization therefore appears particularly weak.
5.2.2 What accounts for FFF anti-Muslim discrimination?
Discrimination of FFF receivers against SM senders in the simultaneous trust game may
reflect anti-Muslim taste-based discrimination, that is, lower unconditional altruism toward
SM senders (as compared to SX senders). It may also reflect statistical discrimination, that
is, lower reciprocal altruism toward SM senders due to the more pessimistic beliefs of FFF
about SM senders’ generosity toward them.
In our follow-up 2010 experiment among 50 FFF players from the 19th district of Paris,
we explicitly test the statistical discrimination hypothesis, i.e. whether FFF receivers are
more pessimistic about SM senders’ donation behavior toward players like them (FFF) in the
2009 simultaneous trust game. To do so, we analyze whether FFF hold different first-order
beliefs about SM and SX, that is whether they are more pessimistic about SM versus SX un-
conditional altruism toward FFF. We also examine whether FFF hold different second-order
beliefs about SM and SX, that is whether they expect SM beliefs about FFF unconditional
altruism toward SM to be more pessimistic than SX beliefs about FFF unconditional altru-
ism toward SX. The 2010 strategic dictator game, described in Appendix A3, allows us to
test whether FFF hold different first-order beliefs about SM and about SX. Our results, also
reported in Appendix A3, show that FFF guesses about SM unconditional altruism toward
FFF recipients do not differ from FFF guesses about SX unconditional altruism toward FFF
recipients. To test whether FFF hold different second-order beliefs about SM and SX, we
rely on the 2010 double strategic dictator game. This game is described in Appendix A4.
Our results, also reported in Appendix A4, show that FFF do not expect SM beliefs about
FFF unconditional altruism toward SM to be more pessimistic than SX beliefs about FFF
unconditional altruism toward SX. In other words, these results suggest that the difference
between the amount sent back by FFF receiver to SM sender and the amount sent back by
FFF receiver to SX sender reveals differences in FFF unconditional altruism toward SM and
SX, not differences in FFF beliefs about SM and SX behavior.
An alternative interpretation of FFF discrimination of SM in the simultaneous trust
game is that it reflects, not taste-based discrimination, but discrimination based on the
belief that SX are poorer than SM and therefore need more money. In our 2010 experiment,
we explicitly test whether FFF hold different beliefs about the income levels of our 2009
SM and SX players. Our test and results are reported in Appendix A5, and show that FFF
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expect no difference in the monthly income of SM and SX recipients. We can thus rule out
this alternative interpretation.
Overall, our results show that FFF discriminate against Muslims they are able to identify
as Muslims.38 Moreover, our experimental evidence suggests that this discrimination is taste-
based.39 Note that one may be surprised that rooted French mistakenly believe that SM
and SX are equally cooperative. Indeed, their everyday real-world interactions with SM and
SX should allow them to update their beliefs based on what they observe. However, this
presupposes that FFF are actually interacting with SM: this would require us to believe
that interactions between FFF and SM are sufficiently frequent to permit updating, an
assumption belied by the levels of social isolation faced by most immigrant communities in
France.40
5.3 Do SM distrust their hosts more than do SX?
We have shown that FFF discriminate against Muslims they identify as such. We now ask
whether Muslims distrust their hosts, that is rooted French and French institutions, more
than do SX (i.e., whether SM beliefs about rooted French and French institutions attitudes
toward SM are more negative than SX beliefs about rooted French and French institutions
attitudes toward SX). If so, their non-assimilation can be best understood as part of an
equilibrium. To address this question, we turn to the 2009 strategic dictator game41 and
then the CSA survey to measure SM (relative to SX) distrust toward rooted French and
38Our finding contradicts the claim by Jacquemet and Yannelis (2012) according to which anti-minority
discrimination by the dominant group in Western countries does not reflect discrimination against any
specific minority, but rather discrimination against all groups which sound foreign (what they call “ethnic
homophily”).
39The fact that FFF do not treat SM and SX differently when FFF are senders, but that they do discrimi-
nate against SM when FFF are receivers brings additional support to the fact that FFF exhibit taste-based,
not statistical discrimination. Indeed, the amount sent in the trust game, whether simultaneous or not, is
commonly considered by experimental economists as a signal of trust (hence the name given to this game).
In this context, if FFF exhibit taste-based discrimination, it is not surprising that they do not discriminate
against SM when they behave as senders but that they do discriminate when they behave as receivers. Be-
sides belief-based reciprocal altruism, the amount sent back in the simultaneous trust game indeed captures
unconditional altruism.
40See Algan, He´met and Laitin (2012) who show that even in the HLM sector where immigrant communities
and rooted French live close to each other, housing surveys show very low levels of social interaction between
them.
41Note that relying on this game runs against us finding any difference between SM and SX beliefs about
FFF behavior toward SM and SX respectively. As already mentioned, the 2009 strategic dictator game and
its companion, the 2009 dictator game, took place after the speed-chatting game, once we can no longer
identify anti-Muslim discrimination on the part of FFF. Yet, our results show that this phenomenon is
not anticipated (or fully anticipated at least) by Muslims since the 2009 strategic dictator game reveals
differences between SM and SX beliefs about FFF behavior toward SM and SX respectively.
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French institutions respectively.
5.3.1 Do SM distrust rooted French more than do SX? Results from the 2009
strategic dictator game
The strategic dictator game (see Appendix A2 for the protocol) helps us to determine the
beliefs of our 2009 players about FFF unconditional altruism toward the various recipients
in the 2009 dictator game. Namely, our analysis of this game – in which players are rewarded
for correctly guessing the actual donations in the dictator game of an FFF player, to SM
and SX faces – allows us to test whether (i) SM distrust FFF more than do SX, meaning
that SM expectations about FFF unconditional altruism toward SM are significantly lower
than SX expectations about FFF unconditional altruism toward SX; (ii) SM expect FFF to
be less generous toward SM than toward SX (i.e., to discriminate against SM).
We test both hypotheses by estimating Equation (5) over a set of triads composed of SM
or SX guessers, FFF dictators and SM or SX recipients:
y = a+ b.(SM FFF → SM) + c.(SM FFF → SX) + d′.X+ e.Face + f ′.Π+ ϵ, (5)
where y refers to the guesses about FFF dictators’ donations. The dummy (SM FFF →
SM) is equal to 1 if the guesser is SM and the recipient is SM and to 0 otherwise. The
dummy (SM FFF → SX) is equal to 1 if the guesser is SM and the recipient is SX and to
0 otherwise. The reference category is the dummy (SX  FFF → SX) that is equal to 1 if
the guesser is SX and the recipient is SX and to 0 otherwise. As a consequence, coefficient
b captures the difference between SM expectations about FFF dictators’ donations to SM
recipients and SX expectations about FFF dictators’ donations to SX recipients. In other
words, coefficient b allows us to test whether SM distrust rooted French more than do SX
(i.e., whether SM beliefs about FFF unconditional altruism toward SM is lower than SX
beliefs about FFF unconditional altruism toward SX). Moreover, the difference between
coefficient b and coefficient c captures the difference between SM expectations about FFF
dictator donations to SM recipients and SM expectations about FFF dictator donations to
SX recipients. In other words, this difference allows us to test whether SM expect FFF
anti-Muslim discrimination, that is whether SM expect FFF to be less generous toward SM
than toward SX. X is a vector of control for a series of socioeconomic characteristics of
the guesser (gender, age, household income, education, religiosity and whether the player
knows players who participated in previous game sessions). Additionally, in order to run a
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within-face analysis, we introduce the Face dummy that is equal to 1 if the recipient is the
Senegalese woman (and 0 if the recipient is the Senegalese man). Finally, we introduce Π,
a vector of session fixed effects. Note that standard errors are clustered at the guesser level
since guesses from the same guesser cannot be considered independent of one another.
Table 11 presents OLS estimates from four model specifications of Equation (5). In
column 1, we control for the ethnic identity of the guesser and of the recipient only. In
column 2, we add recipient face fixed effects as well as session fixed effects. In column 3, we
include the socio-demographic characteristics of the guesser. Since this inclusion generates
a reduction in the sample size from 41 to 34 observations due to missing values, we run a
multiple imputation analysis in column 4.
The coefficient in row (1) in columns 1, 2, and 3 is negative and significant at least
at the 90% confidence level, confirming that SM expectations about FFF unconditional
altruism toward SM are significantly lower than SX expectations about FFF unconditional
altruism toward SX.42 In other words, our results reveal that SM distrust FFF more than
do SX. However, the last Wald test at the bottom of Table 11 (which is never significant
in all four columns) shows that SM higher distrust toward FFF is not accompanied by SM
expectations of FFF discrimination against them. More precisely, SM do not expect FFF to
be less generous toward SM than toward SX. They simply expect, more than do SX, lower
FFF unconditional altruism toward both SM and SX.
This last result is consistent with the lessons we were able to draw from ethnographic
interviews for our project. These interviews were conducted in 2009, and covered the as-
similation patterns of 19 SM and 22 SX in the greater Paris region (Ile-de-France), Lyon,
Nantes, and Bordeaux.43 Although SM respondents were more likely to report a sense of
being unwanted in France as compared to SX respondents, only one of the SM respondents
considered religion as the reason for such discrimination. By contrast, race was highlighted
by a majority of SM , as well as by a majority of SX, as the reason underlying discrimination
in France.
42Although this result holds both in a difference of means analysis (not shown here) and in the first three
columns of Table 11, it loses significance in column 4 when the multiple imputation analysis is run (but the
p-value of 0.16 associated with the coefficient in row (1) is close to statistical significance). This weakening
of the significance is likely due to the fact that multiple imputation typically generates high standard errors
when the number of observations is low (Equation (6) is estimated on 41 observations only).
43The project employed two ethnographers to run these interviews: Etienne Smith (then a Ph.D. candidate
in political science at Sciences-Po, who had conducted extensive field research in Senegal, and speaks Wolof,
the lingua franca of Senegal, a language spoken by nearly all of our respondents) and Mahnaz Shirali (a
Ph.D. in Sociology at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales who has published extensively on
Muslim youth and gender in France and Iran).
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One should note that the difficulty of SM to figure out on which ground they are discrim-
inated against by FFF is easily understandable: as already emphasized when we motivated
our identification strategy, research on discrimination itself has so far been unable to disen-
tangle a religious effect from other possible confounds such as race. However, if SM do not
manage to clearly identify the cause of FFF discrimination in face-to-face interactions, one
expects them to show better ability in correctly updating their beliefs when FFF behavior
is mediated by French institutions (labor market, schooling system, administration ... etc).
Two non mutually exclusive explanations could account for this discrepancy in SM ability
to detect FFF discrimination. First, FFF are likely to avoid interpersonal interactions with
Muslims, precisely because, as we have shown, they attach disutility (distaste) to contact
with Muslims: Muslims therefore lack opportunities to correctly update their beliefs. Sec-
ond, FFF may be susceptible to acting in a socially desirable way in a context where their
actions are observable (which is not the case in our field experiment, where all player deci-
sions were anonymous and private). By contrast, FFF cannot avoid dealing with Muslims
– and thus discriminating against them – through French institutions. This is all the more
true since, behind the veil of institutions, FFF individual actions are not observable, and
thus not prone to social desirability bias. The following section puts this intuition to test.
5.3.2 Do SM distrust French institutions more than do SX? Results from the
CSA survey
Seven questions in the CSA survey allow us to capture the respondent’s distrust toward
French institutions, and specifically (i) the schooling system, (ii) the police, (iii) the par-
liament, (iv) the administration, (v) the judicial system, (vi) the trade unions and (vii)
private firms. We analyze SM and SX answers to those questions by estimating Equation
(1). Results are reported in Table 12. We observe that the coefficient of the dummy SM is
always positive. Moreover, with the exception of column 2 (distrust toward the police), it is
always significant at least at the 95% confidence level. These findings clearly indicate that
distrust toward French institutions is significantly higher among SM than among SX respon-
dents, despite the fact that survey questions are prone to elicit socially desirable answers.44
These results are fully consistent with those stemming from the 2009 strategic dictator game
according to which SM distrust FFF more than do SX.
44The significance level for the dummy SM does not change if we impute missing data, with the exception
of column (3) (i.e., distrust toward the parliament) and column (5) (i.e., distrust toward the judicial system)
where the dummy SM loses significance (results available upon request).
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Does the CSA survey allow us to go one step further by showing that SM expect French
institutions to be more discriminatory toward SM than toward SX (a result that did not
emerge among the face-to-face interactions of the 2009 strategic dictator game)? Six ques-
tions in the CSA survey measure whether the respondent considers that the following French
institutions treat individuals on an equal basis: the police, the immigration authorities, the
prefecture, the judicial system, the schooling system, and the Poˆle Emploi (the French na-
tional employment agency). Results are reported in Table 13. We observe that the coefficient
of the dummy SM is always negative and significant: SM are less likely than SX to agree
that these various French institutions treat individuals on an equal basis.45
Overall, our findings reveal that SM distrust their hosts (both rooted French and French
institutions) more than do SX but this distrust, as our survey instrument suggests, is fully
recognized as such only in the context of evaluating French institutions. Combined with
our result that rooted French exhibit taste-based discrimination against those they are able
to identify as Muslims, these findings are best summarized in terms of a discriminatory
equilibrium between rooted French and Muslims: Muslims, who perceive discrimination as
institutionalized, are reluctant to assimilate and rooted French, who are able to identify
Muslims as such due to their lower assimilation, reveal their distaste for Muslims by acting
less altruistically towards them.
6 Robustness checks
Three factors could challenge our results. First, in the CSA survey, the initial migrant to
France may systematically differ in his or her assimilation potential, depending on when
s/he arrived to France. If this is the case, then the conclusion that SM lower assimilation
and SX higher assimilation follow parallel trends over time (they do not converge) may not
only capture the impact of the time spent in France on SM and SX assimilation, but also
the fact that the initial level of assimilation upon arrival to France differs across these two
groups, depending on when the first migrants in those groups settled in France. To ensure
that this bias is not at work, it is therefore necessary to confirm that the gap between the
assimilation of the first migrants who arrived earlier and those who arrived later does not
differ across SM and SX families. Second, one may worry that SM lower cooperation toward
45The significance level for the dummy SM does not change if we impute missing data, with the exception
of column (1) (i.e., agreement with the fact that the police treats individuals on an equal basis) and column
(2) (i.e., agreement with the fact that immigration authorities treat individuals on an equal basis) where the
dummy SM loses significance (results available upon request).
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their game partners merely captures the fact that SM and SX are characterized by different
gender norms. Adida, Laitin and Valfort (2012a) indeed show that SM men are significantly
less generous toward women in general than are SX men, while SM women are significantly
less generous toward women of their in-group than are SX women. We therefore need to test
whether our results hold when we exclude cases where the dictator is male and the recipient
is female, as well as cases where the dictator and the recipient are both SM or SX females.
Third, our result that FFF receivers discriminate against SM senders in the simultaneous
trust game may be biased by the influence of facial traits. In an original trust game, Eckel
and Wilson (2006) indeed show that attractive receivers are viewed as more trustworthy:
they are trusted at higher rates by the sender and as a consequence receive more from her.
We must therefore test whether FFF anti-Muslim discrimination is robust to controls for the
beauty, friendliness and trustworthiness FFF could infer from the facial traits of our 2009
players.
6.1 Do the first migrants who arrived earlier and those who ar-
rived later systematically differ in terms of assimilation across
SM and SX families?
To measure the assimilation of the first migrant to France, we focus on respondents’ answers
to three questions in the CSA survey: (i) whether the first male migrant married a non-French
(African) woman; (ii) whether the first migrant married someone of the same religion; (iii)
whether all the parents and grandparents of the respondent married someone of African
background. In the following, we first investigate whether the results obtained based on
these questions are consistent with our finding according to which SM show, on average,
lower assimilation than do SX. We then tackle the critical issue of whether SM and SX first
migrants systematically differ in terms of assimilation upon arrival in France, depending on
when they arrived.
Table 14, models (1), (3) and (5) test Equation (1) applied to the three survey measures
above. The positive and significant coefficient of the dummy SM in all three columns con-
firms that SM first migrants are significantly more attached to their continent of origin and
significantly less secularized than are SX first migrants, holding their time of arrival at its
average.46 These results are fully consistent with our finding according to which SM show,
46These results hold if we run a multiple imputation analysis.
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on average, lower assimilation than do SX.
Does the gap between the assimilation of the first migrants who arrived earlier and those
who arrived later differ across SM and SX families? Table 14, models (2), (4) and (6)
estimate Equation (2) applied to the three survey measures above. The coefficient of the
interaction term SM.Time is never significant, indicating that the difference in assimilation
of first migrants between SM and SX families does not depend on the time of arrival of these
first migrants.47 Our main survey-based result according to which SM lower assimilation and
SX higher assimilation follow parallel trends over time is therefore only due to the impact of
the time spent in France, not to the additional impact of differences in assimilation between
SM and SX first migrants that would depend on when they settled in France.
6.2 Does lower SM cooperation toward their game partners sim-
ply reflect SM gender norms?
Adida, Laitin and Valfort (2012a) show that SM men are significantly less generous toward
women in general than are SX men, while SM women are significantly less generous toward
women of their in-group than are SX women. We therefore need to test whether SM lower
cooperation toward their game partners hold when we exclude cases where the dictator
is male and the recipient is female, as well as cases where the dictator and the recipient
are both SM or SX females. Our results (not shown, but available upon request) confirm
that SM cooperate significantly less in the 2009 simultaneous trust game (although we lose
significance regarding the amount sent back), voting game and dictator game when such
cases are excluded. Put differently, lower SM cooperation toward their game partners is not
driven by the fact that SM and SX gender norms differ.
6.3 Is FFF behavior in the simultaneous trust game robust to
controlling for the facial traits of their game partners?
To control for the influence of facial traits in the simultaneous trust game, we asked FFF par-
ticipants in our 2010 experiments to examine pictures of our 2009 players and evaluate their
beauty, friendliness and trustworthiness. More precisely, in this Beauty game, FFF players
were shown, sequentially, a series of photographs of our Senegalese and FFF participants in
47These results hold if we run a multiple imputation analysis.
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our 2009 experiments.48 For each photograph, FFF players were asked to choose, for each
of 3 pairs of adjectives (pretty/ugly; friendly/unfriendly; trustworthy/untrustworthy) which
one best corresponded to the photographed player. Six options were available for each pair.
For instance, for the pair (friendly/unfriendly), the player could select: “very friendly”,
“friendly”, “somewhat friendly”, “somewhat unfriendly”, “unfriendly”, “very unfriendly”.
Figure 2 illustrates a sample screenshot of the 2010 Beauty game.
We assign to each Senegalese and FFF players from our 2009 experiments the average
beauty, friendliness and trustworthiness scores assigned to them by our 2010 FFF players.
We add these controls in our OLS estimation of Equation (3) and Equation (4) for the
amount sent back by the receiver.
Table 15 reports the OLS estimates with imputation of missing values (note that the
controls for the facial traits of the 2009 SM, SX and FFF players do not have any missing
values). The significant negative coefficient of the dummy (FFF→ SM) in column 1 confirms
that FFF receivers send back significantly less to SM senders than to SX senders, even when
we control for the facial traits of the sender and of the receiver. Moreover, the significant
coefficient of the dummy (FFF → SMM) and the non significant coefficient of the dummy
(FFF → SMA) in column 2, indicate that this result holds only for SM recipients with
recognizable Muslim names (SMM).
7 Conclusion
This paper relies on a unique identification strategy to compare the assimilation patterns,
on average and over time, of Muslim and Christian immigrants in France and, furthermore,
to identify the mechanism driving those differences. Survey-based results reveal that Mus-
lim immigrants show significantly lower assimilation (i.e., higher attachment to their culture
of origin and lower identification with the host culture and society) than do their Chris-
tian counterparts and that this difference persists regardless of the time immigrants spend
in France. Experimental results indicate that the persistence of lower Muslim assimilation
is consistent with Muslims and rooted French being locked in a sub-optimal equilibrium
whereby: (i) rooted French exhibit taste-based discrimination against those they are able to
identify as Muslims (due to the fact for instance that these Muslims keep recognizable Mus-
lim first names instead of adopting French-sounding names) and (ii) Muslims perceive French
48For expediency, a random half of the 2010 FFF players were shown half of our 2009 Senegalese and FFF
players; the other random half were shown the other half of our 2009 Senegalese and FFF players.
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institutions as systematically discriminatory against them. This equilibrium is sustained be-
cause Muslims, perceiving discrimination as institutionalized, are reluctant to assimilate and
rooted French, who are able to identify Muslims as Muslims due to their lower assimilation,
reveal their distaste for Muslims by acting less altruistically toward them.
Our finding that rooted French and SM are locked in a sub-optimal equilibrium offers
a potential explanation for the economic handicap faced by Muslims in France today49 and
highlights the need for an equilibrium shift. Indeed, taste-based discrimination against
Muslims has both direct and indirect negative effects on their prospects of economic success
in France. With the direct effect, taste-based discrimination should lead Muslims to perform
worse than their non-Muslim counterparts in markets that are critical for successful economic
integration of immigrants, such as the labor, housing, or marriage markets.50 With the
indirect effect, the discriminated minority assimilates less because of discrimination. This
lower assimilation is expected to further strengthen the direct negative effect of anti-Muslim
taste-based discrimination by potentially fueling rooted French statistical discrimination
against Muslims.51
It is in the nature of equilibria that no party has an incentive to unilaterally change its
behavior. This helps explain the ineffectiveness of many prejudice-reducing policies uncov-
ered in Paluck and Green’s extensive review of the literature (2009). What follows from our
discussion is the necessity to take a two-pronged approach toward discrimination reduction.
On the one hand, it would be useful to highlight to the rooted French that their behavior
belies their republican ideals. How can this be done? Pope, Price and Wolfers (2011) have
recently shown the benefits of broadcasting research findings on discrimination, especially in
49Adida, Laitin and Valfort (2010) identify that Senegalese Muslim households in France earn, on average,
400 euros less than their Christian counterparts each month (the equivalent of 14% of the average monthly
household income for France in 2009). See Constant and Zimmermann (2008) and Bisin, Pattachini, Verdier
and Zenou (2011b) for further evidence on the relationship between low assimilation and poor economic
performance in Europe.
50Adida, Laitin and Valfort (2010) confirm that significant anti-Muslim discrimination prevails in the
French labor market. They compare the rate of interview callbacks received by two French applicants of
Senegalese background showing the same educational and work experience but differing on religion, with
a similar experimental design as in Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004). They confirm that the Muslim
applicant faces high prejudice in France in 2009: she is 2.5 times less likely to receive a callback for an
interview than is her Christian counterpart.
51Our experimental results clearly show that rooted French players do not expect SM to be less cooperative
than SX. However, rooted French more exposed to contact with minorities, like recruiters, may hold correct
beliefs. Relying on 400 interviews with human resources managers in large French firms, Bouzar and Bouzar
(2010) indeed show that H.R. personnel report partly conditioning their hiring decisions (this is at least a
post facto rationalization of such decisions) on their beliefs about what Muslims will do to the esprit-de-corps
of their work teams. Perception of Muslims’ higher attachment to their religion and culture of origin is listed
among the factors underlying their preferences for non-Muslims over Muslims.
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an institutional environment committed to fair play. These authors refer to the considerable
media attention given to a working paper by Price and Wolfers in 2007 (but published in
2010) documenting that personal fouls are relatively more likely to be called against NBA
basketball players when they are officiated by an opposite-race refereeing crew. Pope, Price
and Wolfers (2011) show that this media coverage durably erased racial bias by referees.
Their finding suggests that making public academic research on discrimination, like the one
provided in this paper, could bring about meaningful change in religious discriminatory be-
havior, especially among the French, who aspire in their republican ideology to treat all
citizens equally. On the other hand, Muslims can collectively reveal a commitment to assim-
ilate. One route would be to encourage them to do as many aspiring immigrant groups do
around the world, that is, to give French-sounding first names to their children. While the
rooted French (if distaste remains) are then likely to seek other clues for Muslim identity,
this might serve the Muslim community well as a transitional tactic to induce an equilibrium
shift. When it comes to social norms, equilibria shift are not trivial to induce (see Mackie
(1996)); but this paper suggests that this is the challenge France faces in light of a harmful
and potentially dangerous discriminatory equilibrium.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Comparing average SM/SX attachment to the country/continent of origin.
SX SM Raw diff. Regression-adjusted diff.
(a) (b) (b)-(a) (b)-(a)
(1) Visit: =1 if the respondent has ever been to Africa, =0 otherwise
0.850 0.920 0.070** 0.105**
(N=127) (N=339) (N=466) (N=295)
(2) Remit: =1 if the respondent sends remittances to Africa, =0 otherwise
0.520 0.584 0.064 0.102*
(N=127) (N=339) (N=466) (N=295)
(3) Sympathy: sympathy of the respondent toward Senegalese living in Senegal (from 1 to 10)
8.268 8.298 0.030 0.048
(N=127) (N=329) (N=456) (N=292)
(4) Best friend: =1 if the grandparents of the respondent’s best friend originate from Africa, ... 0.504 0.634 0.130** 0.188***
... =0 otherwise (N=127) (N=328) (N=455) (N=290)
(5) Association: =1 if the association the respondent belongs to is related to Africa, =0 otherwise
0.286 0.425 0.139* 0.265***
(N=42) (N=134) (N=176) (N=127)
(6) Commonalities: commonalities the respondent believes she shares with people from... 2.969 3.175 0.206** 0.217**
... Senegal (from 1 to 4) (N=127) (N=338) (N=465) (N=295)
(7) Burial: =1 if the respondent wants to be buried in Africa, =0 otherwise
0.437 0.767 0.330*** 0.386***
(N=103) (N=287) (N=390) (N=250)
(8) Home: =1 if the respondent owns a home in Africa, =0 otherwise
0.795 0.891 0.096** 0.134**
(N=127) (N=339) (N=466) (N=295)
(9) Sick mother=disapproval of a Senegalese student who does not renounce a scholarship... 2.276 2.361 0.085 0.096
... in a top French university to take care of a sick mother in Senegal (from 1 to 3) (N=127) (N=332) (N=459) (N=292)
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report the mean value for SX and SM respectively. Column 3 reports the difference between the mean values in columns 1 and 2. Column 4 reports the OLS estimate
of coefficient b in Equation (1), when standard errors are robust. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
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Table 2a: Comparing average SM/SX identification with the French culture and society.
SX SM Raw diff. Regression-adjusted diff.
(a) (b) (b)-(a) (b)-(a)
(1) Sympathy: sympathy of the respondent toward French people (from 1 to 10)
7.619 7.404 -0.215 -0.673***
(N=126) (N=329) (N=455) (N=291)
(2) No conflict: =1 if the respondent believes immigrants should do whatever... 0.593 0.500 -0.093* -0.135**
... possible to avoid conflict with the hosting society, =0 otherwise (N=123) (N=326) (N=449) (N=286)
(3) Best friend: =1 if the grandparents of the respondent’s best friend originate from France, ... 0.394 0.201 -0.193*** -0.262***
... =0 otherwise (N=127) (N=328) (N=455) (N=290)
(4) Left-Right: =1 if the respondent’s political preferences can be positioned on... 0.752 0.615 -0.137*** -0.176***
... a typical left-wing/right-wing scale, =0 otherwise (N=117) (N=312) (N=429) (N=276)
(5) Commonalities: commonalities the respondent believes she shares... 2.888 2.713 -0.175** -0.173*
... with French people (from 1 to 4) (N=125) (N=335) (N=460) (N=292)
(6) Burial: =1 if the respondent wants to be buried in France, =0 otherwise
0.485 0.160 -0.325*** -0.357***
(N=103) (N=287) (N=390) (N=250)
(7) Hide father: approval of a man of Senegalese origin who hides from his white... 1.325 1.203 -0.122*** -0.223***
... son’s friends so that they may believe the son is a rooted French (from 1 to 3) (N=126) (N=335) (N=461) (N=294)
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report the mean value for SX and SM respectively. Column 3 reports the difference between the mean values in columns 1 and 2. Column 4 reports the OLS estimate
of coefficient b in Equation (1), when standard errors are robust. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
Table 2b: Comparing average SM/SX secularization.
SX SM Raw diff. Regression-adjusted diff.
(a) (b) (b)-(a) (b)-(a)
(1) God: importance of god in the respondent’s life (from 1 to 10)
7.592 9.006 1.414*** 1.456***
(N=125) (N=330) (N=455) (N=291)
(2) Exogamy: disapproval of one’s child if he/she married a religious other (from 1 to 3)
1.880 2.075 0.195*** 0.174**
(N=125) (N=335) (N=460) (N=293)
(3) Sympathy: sympathy of the respondent toward people sharing the same religion (from 1 to 10)
8.073 8.360 0.287 0.331
(N=124) (N=331) (N=455) (N=291)
(4) Best friend: =1 if the respondent’s best friend is of the same religion, =0 otherwise
0.589 0.675 0.086* 0.107*
(N=124) (N=320) (N=444) (N=287)
(5) Association: =1 if the association the respondent belongs to is related to religion, =0 otherwise
0.071 0.127 0.056 0.048
(N=42) (N=134) (N=176) (N=127)
(6) Commonalities: commonalities the respondent believes she shares... 2.912 3.190 0.278*** 0.272**
... with people of the same religion (from 1 to 4) (N=125) (N=336) (N=461) (N=291)
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report the mean value for SX and SM respectively. Column 3 reports the difference between the mean values in columns 1 and 2. Column 4 reports the OLS estimate
of coefficient b in Equation (1), when standard errors are robust. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
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Table 3: Comparing the assimilation pattern over time of SM and SX. OLS analysis.
Panel A: Attachment to the country/continent of origin
Visit Remit Best Friend Association Commonalities Burial Home
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
SM.Time 0.004 0.013* 0.009 -0.006 0.009 0.012 0.011*
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.008) (0.006)
R2 0.068 0.115 0.057 0.170 0.020 0.166 0.053
Observations 295 295 290 127 295 250 295
Panel B: Identification with the French culture and society
Sympathy No conflict Best Friend Left-Right Commonalities Burial Hide father
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
SM.Time -0.033 0.004 -0.002 0.008 -0.005 -0.005 -0.009
(0.030) (0.009) (0.003) (0.007) (0.014) (0.008) (0.010)
R2 0.064 0.023 0.100 0.038 0.043 0.145 0.047
Observations 291 286 290 276 292 250 294
Panel C: Secularization
God Exogamy Best Friend Commonalities
(1) (2) (3) (4)
SM.Time 0.081** 0.004 0.007 -0.013
(0.034) 0.009 0.007 0.013
R2 0.147 0.081 0.028 0.040
Observations 291 293 287 291
Notes: The table reports the OLS estimate of coefficient c in Equation (2), when standard errors are robust. The dependent variables
in Panel A are defined in Table 1. The dependent variables in Panel B are defined in Table 2a. The dependent variables in Panel C are
defined in Table 2b. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
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Table 4: Socioeconomic characteristics of SM and SX participants in our 2009 experiments. Difference of means
analysis.
SM SX Difference
Variable
(a) (b) (b-a)
0.50 0.55 +0.05
Female
(N=16) (N=11) p=0.83
33.19 31.45 -1.74
Age
(N=16) (N=11) p=0.59
7.33 7.63 +0.30
Education
(N=15) (N=8) p=0.83
3.79 4.00 +0.21
Household income
(N=14) (N=9) p=0.85
2.60 4.90 +2.30
Religiosity
(N=15) (N=10) p=0.00
0.43 0.36 -0.07
Knows players from previous game sessions
(N=16) (N=11) p=0.71
Notes: The table reports arithmetic means for the sub-samples of SM and SX players, and
two-tailed t-tests assuming unequal variances. “Female” takes the value 1 if the participant
is female and 0 otherwise. “Age” is equal to the age of the participant. “Education” ranges
from 1 (less than primary school completed) to 10 (higher than college degree completed).
“Household income” ranges from 1 (less than 500 euros monthly) to 11 (more than 7,500 euros
monthly). “Religiosity” ranges from 1 (never attends religious services) to 7 (attends religious
services several times a week). “Knows players from previous sessions” takes the value 1 if the
participant knows players who participated in previous game sessions and 0 otherwise.
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Table 5: Position of “FFF” respondents to the 2009 ESS and of FFF participants in our 2009 experiments on a left
wing-right wing scale. Difference of means analysis.
“FFF” respondents to the 2009 ESS FFF participants in our 2009 experiment Diff
(a) (b) (b-a)
1.94 1.42 -0.52***
(N=64) (N=19) p=0.01
Notes: The table reports a difference of means analysis. The variable of interest captures the position of re-
spondents on a left wing-right wing scale. It ranges from 1 to 3, where 1 means “more leftist than rightist”, 2
means “in-between” and 3 means “more rightist than leftist.” *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5
and 1% levels.
Table 6: Position of “FFF” respondents to the 2009 ESS and of FFF participants in our 2009 experiment on a left
wing-right wing scale. OLS analysis.
Dep. var.: Position on a left wing-right wing scale
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1) European Social Survey 0.516*** 0.522*** 0.517*** 0.473** 0.447**
(0.177) (0.176) (0.179) (0.191) (0.198)
(2) Female 0.063 0.054 0.046 -0.007
(0.183) (0.202) (0.203) (0.211)
(3) Age 0.001 -0.001 0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.007)
(4) Education -0.093 -0.050
(0.105) (0.111)
(5) Household income -0.130
(0.089)
R2 0.065 0.066 0.066 0.074 0.110
Observations 83 83 83 83 75
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is the respondent. The dependent
variable ranges from 1 to 3, where 1 means “more leftist than rightist”, 2 means “in-between” and 3
means “more rightist than leftist.” “European Social Survey” takes the value 1 if the individual is a
respondent to the 2009 ESS, and 0 if she is a participant in our 2009 experiments. “Female” takes
the value 1 if the individual is female and 0 otherwise. “Age” is equal to the age of the individual.
“Education” ranges from 1 (less than lower secondary completed) to 4 (post secondary completed).
“Household income” ranges from 1 (first quintile) to 5 (fifth quintile). Standard errors are robust. *,
** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
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Table 7: First names of the 2009 SM and SX players.
First names of SM players First names of SX players
AMADOU CECILE
AMIE CHRISTINE
ASTOU DANIEL
AWA EPHIGENIE
CIRE GASTON
FATOUMATA HELENE
IBOU LOUIS
IBRAHIMA MAMADOU JEAN
KALS NINA
KHADY ROBERT ANTOINE
MAMADOU LAMINE THERESE
MOUSTAPHA
NDEYE
OUSMANE
SIDY
SIRE
TAMSIR
YACINE
Figure 1: Sample screenshot for the 2010 Names Game.
Translation of Figure 1: “What do you think is the religious heritage of this person (Christian, Muslim, Buddhist,
Jewish, Hindu, Animist)? Which region do you think this person comes from (North America, Latin America and the
Caribbean, North Africa and the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, Europe, Asia)?”
Table 8: Categorization of 2009 SM players’ first names as SMM or SMA by our 2010 FFF players.
First names of SMM players First names of SMA players
AMADOU AMIE
AWA ASTOU
FATOUMATA CIRE
IBRAHIMA IBOU
KHADY KALS
MAMADOU LAMINE SIDY
MOUSTAPHA SIRE
NDEYE TAMSIR
OUSMANE
YACINE
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Table 9: Amount sent by the sender in the 2009 simultaneous trust game. OLS analysis.
Dep. var.: Amount sent by the sender
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) FFF → SM -0.071 -0.166 -0.352 -0.232
(2) FFF → SMM -0.062 -0.220 -0.543 -0.326
(3) FFF → SMA -0.083 -0.098 -0.117 -0.108
(4) SX → All -0.675*** -0.675*** -0.614*** -0.614*** -1.011*** -0.988*** -0.670** -0.656**
(5) SM → All -0.801*** -0.801*** -0.853*** -0.855*** -1.437*** -1.443*** -1.071*** -1.066***
SES of the sender
(6) Female -0.516 -0.526* -0.413* -0.402*
(7) Age 0.001 0.003 0.002 0.003
(8) Household income 0.029 0.033 0.033 0.035
(9) Education -0.020 -0.024 -0.030 -0.031
(10) Religiosity -0.058 -0.060 -0.053 -0.055
(11) Knows players from previous sessions 0.824*** 0.856*** 0.632*** 0.641***
SES of the receiver
(12) Female -0.038 -0.031 -0.106 -0.113
(13) Age 0.005 0.003 0.004 0.003
(14) Household income 0.026 0.028 0.018 0.020
(15) Education -0.035 -0.036 -0.030 -0.030
(16) Religiosity -0.034 -0.034 -0.030 -0.029
(17) Knows players from previous sessions 0.019 0.001 -0.014 -0.024
P-value of the test: (1)=0 0.60 0.26 0.11 0.27
P-value of the test: (2)=0 0.77 0.37 0.11 0.26
P-value of the test: (3)=0 0.64 0.61 0.62 0.66
P-value of the test: (4)=(5) 0.66 0.66 0.22 0.22 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02
Session fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Multiple Imputation Analysis No No No No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.117 0.117 0.293 0.294 0.474 0.479 0.382 0.384
Observations 178 178 178 178 134 134 178 178
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is a dyad formed of FFF and SM or SX players. The dependent variable ranges from 0 (the sender
sends nothing to the receiver) to 3 (the sender sends her total endowment to the receiver). “FFF → SM” takes the value 1 if the sender is FFF and the receiver is SM,
and 0 otherwise. “FFF → SMM” takes the value 1 if the sender is FFF and the receiver is SMM, and 0 otherwise. “FFF → SMA” takes the value 1 if the sender is
FFF and the receiver is SMA, and 0 otherwise. “SM → All” takes the value 1 if the sender is SM and the receiver is any game partner, and 0 otherwise. “SX → All”
takes the value 1 if the sender is SX and the receiver is any game partner, and 0 otherwise. The omitted category is the dummy “FFF → SX” that takes the value 1 if
the sender is FFF and the receiver is SX, and 0 otherwise. “Female” takes the value 1 if the player is female and 0 otherwise. “Age” is equal to the age of the player.
“Education” ranges from 1 (less than primary school completed) to 10 (higher than college degree completed). “Household income” ranges from 1 (less than 500 euros
monthly) to 11 (more than 7,500 euros monthly). “Religiosity” ranges from 1 (never attends religious services) to 7 (attends religious services several times a week).
“Knows players from previous sessions” takes the value 1 if the player knows players who participated in previous game sessions and 0 otherwise. Standard errors (not
reported here due to space constraints) are clustered at the sender level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
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Table 10: Amount sent back by the receiver in the 2009 simultaneous trust game. OLS analysis.
Dep. var.: Amount sent back by the receiver
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
(1) FFF → SM -0.092* -0.076 -0.243*** -0.149*
(2) FFF → SMM -0.152* -0.161 -0.331** -0.251**
(3) FFF → SMA -0.001 0.052 -0.125 0.022
(4) SX → All -0.031 -0.031 -0.023 -0.021 -0.076 -0.070 0.032 0.050
(5) SM → All -0.117 -0.117 -0.097 -0.099 -0.275** -0.282** -0.128 -0.121
SES of the receiver
(6) Female 0.025 0.011 0.115 0.115
(7) Age 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.003
(8) Household income -0.010 -0.009 -0.004 -0.002
(9) Education 0.016 0.014 -0.003 -0.004
(10) Religiosity -0.027 -0.027 -0.042 -0.044*
(11) Knows players from previous sessions 0.069 0.081 0.107 0.113
SES of the sender
(12) Female -0.093 -0.096 -0.039 -0.049
(13) Age 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000
(14) Household income 0.006 0.008 0.006 0.008
(15) Education -0.022 -0.024 -0.027* -0.028*
(16) Religiosity -0.044** -0.044** -0.033* -0.031
(17) Knows players from previous sessions 0.152* 0.135 0.084 0.061
P-value of the test: (1)=0 0.08 0.24 0.01 0.07
P-value of the test: (2)=0 0.06 0.11 0.01 0.02
P-value of the test: (3)=0 0.99 0.56 0.22 0.84
P-value of the test: (4)=(5) 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.34 0.09 0.07 0.10 0.08
Session fixed effects No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Multiple Imputation Analysis No No No No No No Yes Yes
R2 0.021 0.030 0.128 0.143 0.244 0.257 0.194 0.216
Observations 166 166 166 166 129 129 166 166
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is a dyad formed of FFF and SM or SX players. The dependent variable ranges
from 0 (the receiver sends back nothing to the sender) to 1 (the receiver sends back her total endowment to the sender). “FFF → SM” takes the
value 1 if the receiver is FFF and the sender is SM, and 0 otherwise. “FFF → SMM” takes the value 1 if the receiver is FFF and the sender is SMM,
and 0 otherwise. “FFF → SMA” takes the value 1 if the receiver is FFF and the sender is SMA, and 0 otherwise. “SM → All” takes the value 1 if
the receiver is SM and the sender is any game partner, and 0 otherwise. “SX → FFF” takes the value 1 if the receiver is SX and the sender is any
game partner, and 0 otherwise. The omitted category is the dummy “FFF → SX” that takes the value 1 if the receiver is FFF and the sender is SX,
and 0 otherwise. “Female” takes the value 1 if the player is female and 0 otherwise. “Age” is equal to the age of the player. “Education” ranges
from 1 (less than primary school completed) to 10 (higher than college degree completed). “Household income” ranges from 1 (less than 500 euros
monthly) to 11 (more than 7,500 euros monthly). “Religiosity” ranges from 1 (never attends religious services) to 7 (attends religious services several
times a week). “Knows players from previous sessions” takes the value 1 if the player knows players who participated in previous game sessions and
0 otherwise. Standard errors (not reported here due to space constraints) are clustered at the receiver level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at
the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
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Table 11: SM and SX guesses in the 2009 strategic dictator game. OLS analysis.
Dep. var.: Guesses about dictators’ donations
(1) (2) (3) (4)
(1) SM  FFF → SM -0.636* -0.678** -1.062* -0.729
(0.368) (0.326) (0.552) (0.497)
(2) SM  FFF → SX -0.303 -0.336 -0.765 -0.381
(0.377) (0.295) (0.516) (0.450)
(3) Female 0.129 0.954
(0.820) (0.655)
(4) Age -0.006 -0.018
(0.024) (0.020)
(5) Household income 0.114** 0.091
(0.051) (0.054)
(6) Education -0.057 -0.079
(0.073) (0.074)
(7) Religiosity 0.036 -0.085
(0.126) (0.089)
(8) Knows players from previous sessions -0.183 -0.095
(0.516) (0.313)
P-value of the test: (1)=0 0.09 0.05 0.07 0.16
P-value of the test: (1)=(2) 0.20 0.24 0.45 0.29
Session fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Recipient face fixed effects No Yes Yes Yes
Multiple Imputation Analysis No No No Yes
R2 0.072 0.497 0.649 0.623
Observations 41 41 34 41
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is a triad formed of SM or SX guessers,
FFF dictators and SM or SX recipients. The dependent variable ranges from 0 (the guesser guesses that the
FFF dictator gives 0 euro to the recipient) to 5 (the guesser guesses that the FFF dictator gives 5 euros to
the recipient). “SM  FFF → SM” takes the value 1 if the guesser is SM and the recipient is SM, and 0
otherwise. “SM  FFF → SX” takes the value 1 if the guesser is SM and the recipient is SX, and 0 oth-
erwise. The omitted category is the dummy “SX  FFF → SX” that takes the value 1 if the guesser is SX
and the recipient is SX, and 0 otherwise. “Female” takes the value 1 if the guesser is female and 0 otherwise.
“Age” is equal to the age of the guesser. “Education” ranges from 1 (less than primary school completed) to
10 (higher than college degree completed). “Household income” ranges from 1 (less than 500 euros monthly)
to 11 (more than 7,500 euros monthly). “Religiosity” ranges from 1 (never attends religious services) to 7
(attends religious services several times a week). “Knows players from previous sessions” takes the value 1 if
the guesser knows players who participated in previous game sessions and 0 otherwise. Standard errors are
clustered at the guesser level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
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Table 12: Comparing SM and SX distrust toward French institutions. OLS analysis.
Dep. var.: Distrust toward French institutions
Schooling system Police Parliament Administration Judicial system Trade unions Private firms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
(1) SM 0.380*** 0.166 0.313** 0.426*** 0.357*** 0.209** 0.277**
(0.088) (0.123) (0.123) (0.105) (0.119) (0.106) (0.108)
(2) Time 0.007* 0.004 0.008 0.003 0.005 0.007 0.011*
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
(3) Education -0.016 -0.017 -0.035 -0.036 -0.066** -0.008 -0.025
(0.025) (0.033) (0.032) (0.029) (0.031) (0.030) (0.030)
(4) Female 0.101 -0.136 -0.087 -0.003 -0.193* -0.173 -0.027
(0.085) (0.114) (0.112) (0.103) (0.109) (0.105) (0.104)
(5) Age -0.004 -0.009 0.005 0.003 -0.002 -0.005 0.014
(0.007) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
R2 0.073 0.018 0.043 0.060 0.067 0.031 0.062
Observations 295 295 293 295 295 289 291
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is the respondent. The dependent variables in columns 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6 and 7 capture
distrust toward the schooling system, the police, the parliament, the administration, the judicial system, the trade unions and private firms respec-
tively. Each dependent variable ranges from 1 to 4 where 1 stands for “fully trusts” and 4 stands for “fully distrusts”. “SM” takes the value 1 if the
respondent is SM and 0 if the respondent is SX. The variable “Time” is continuous and captures the number of years elapsed since arrival of the first
migrant in the respondent’s family. “Education” captures the education of the first migrant. It ranges from 1 (no education) to 6 (higher education).
“Female” takes the value 1 if the respondent is female and 0 if the respondent is male. “Age” is equal to the age of the respondent. Standard errors
are robust. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
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Table 13: Comparing SM and SX agreement with “French institutions treat individuals on an equal basis”. OLS analysis.
Dep. var.: Agreement with “French institutions treat individuals on an equal basis”
Police Immigration authorities Prefecture Judicial system Schooling system Poˆle Emploi
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) SM -0.218* -0.265** -0.445*** -0.318*** -0.432*** -0.263**
(0.125) (0.131) (0.135) (0.120) (0.111) (0.125)
(2) Time -0.005 0.001 0.005 -0.008 -0.007 0.004
(0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
(3) Education 0.039 0.017 0.024 0.045 0.063* 0.018
(0.032) (0.033) (0.037) (0.033) (0.033) (0.033)
(4) Female 0.025 -0.222* -0.152 0.001 -0.086 -0.083
(0.107) (0.115) (0.123) (0.117) (0.112) (0.120)
(5) Age 0.011 0.007 -0.013 0.009 0.004 -0.014
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
R2 0.027 0.033 0.047 0.041 0.070 0.023
Observations 293 286 289 293 292 274
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is the respondent. The dependent variables capture whether the respon-
dent considers that the following French institutions treat individuals on an equal basis: the police (column 1), the immigration authorities
(column 2), the prefecture (column 3), the judicial system (column 4), the schooling system (column 5), and the Poˆle Emploi (column 6).
Each dependent variable ranges from 1 to 4 where 1 stands for “fully disagrees” and 4 stands for “fully agrees”. “SM” takes the value 1 if the
respondent is SM and 0 if the respondent is SX. The variable “Time” is continuous and captures the number of years elapsed since arrival of
the first migrant in the respondent’s family. “Education” captures the education of the first migrant. It ranges from 1 (no education) to 6
(higher education). “Female” takes the value 1 if the respondent is female and 0 if the respondent is male. “Age” is equal to the age of the
respondent. Standard errors are robust. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
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Table 14: Comparing the assimilation in France of SM and SX first migrants. OLS analysis.
Dep. var.: Assimilation of SM and SX first migrants
1st mig. married a non-French 1st mig. married a co-rel. All ancestors married an African
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
(1) SM 0.108** -0.106 0.098* -0.029 0.117** 0.418*
(0.045) (0.256) (0.052) (0.307) (0.050) (0.250)
(2) SM.Time 0.000 -0.002 -0.005
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
(3) Time 0.000 0.000 -0.002 -0.000 -0.003 0.001
(0.002) (0.006) (0.002) (0.007) (0.003) (0.005)
(4) SM.Age 0.007 0.007 -0.004
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
(5) Education -0.031*** -0.031*** -0.019 -0.019 -0.006 -0.005
(0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
(6) Female 0.031 0.031 0.067 0.065 -0.004 -0.005
(0.032) (0.033) (0.045) (0.045) (0.040) (0.039)
(7) Age -0.007** -0.012* -0.004 -0.009 -0.000 0.002
(0.003) (0.007) (0.004) (0.008) (0.004) (0.008)
R2 0.109 0.116 0.046 0.048 0.037 0.043
Observations 246 246 279 279 286 286
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is the respondent. The dependent variable in columns 1 and 2 is a
dummy that captures whether the first male migrants married a non-French woman. The dependent variable in columns 3 and 4 is a
dummy that captures whether the first migrant married someone of the same religion. The dependent variable in columns 5 and 6 is
a dummy that captures whether all the parents and grandparents of the respondent married someone of African background. “SM”
takes the value 1 if the respondent is SM and 0 if the respondent is SX. The variable “Time” is continuous and captures the number
of years elapsed since arrival of the first migrant in the respondent’s family. “Education” captures the education of the first migrant.
It ranges from 1 (no education) to 6 (higher education). “Female” takes the value 1 if the respondent is female and 0 if the respondent
is male. “Age” is equal to the age of the respondent. Standard errors are robust. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and
1% levels.
Figure 2: Sample screenshot of the 2010 Beauty game.
Translation of Figure 2: “For each pair of adjectives, choose the option that best corresponds to the photographed per-
son: pretty/ugly (“very pretty”, “pretty”, “somewhat pretty”, “somewhat ugly”, “ugly”, “very ugly”); friendly/unfriendly
(“very friendly”, “friendly”, “somewhat friendly”, “somewhat unfriendly”, “unfriendly”, “very unfriendly”); trustwor-
thy/untrustworthy (“very trustworthy”, “trustworthy”, “somewhat trustworthy”, “somewhat untrustworthy”, “untrustwor-
thy”, “very untrustworthy”).”
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Table 15: Amount sent back by the receiver in the 2009 simultaneous trust game, controlling for the beauty,
friendliness and trustworthiness of the 2009 SM, SX and FFF players.
Dep. var.: Amount sent back by the receiver
(1) (2)
(1) FFF → SM -0.207**
(0.097)
(2) FFF → SMM -0.298**
(0.118)
(3) FFF → SMA -0.031
(0.126)
(4) SX → All 0.103 0.136
(0.131) (0.129)
(5) SM → All -0.136 -0.120
(0.099) (0.101)
Facial traits of the receiver
(6) Beauty -0.009 -0.014
(0.097) (0.099)
(7) Friendliness 0.088 0.086
(0.261) (0.250)
(8) Trustworthiness 0.037 0.048
(0.231) (0.224)
Facial traits of the sender
(9) Beauty 0.072 0.040
(0.080) (0.084)
(10) Friendliness -0.155 -0.170
(0.241) (0.247)
(11) Trustworthiness 0.091 0.131
(0.237) (0.246)
P-value of the test: (1)=0 0.04
P-value of the test: (2)=0 0.02
P-value of the test: (3)=0 0.81
P-value of the test: (4)=(5) 0.04 0.02
Sender/Receiver SES controls Yes Yes
Session fixed effects Yes Yes
Multiple Imputation Analysis Yes Yes
R2 0.258 0.280
Observations 141 141
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is a dyad formed of FFF and
SM or SX players. The dependent variable ranges from 0 (the receiver sends back nothing to
the sender) to 1 (the receiver sends back her total endowment to the sender). “FFF → SM”
takes the value 1 if the receiver is FFF and the sender is SM, and 0 otherwise. “FFF → SMM”
takes the value 1 if the receiver is FFF and the sender is SMM, and 0 otherwise. “FFF → SMA”
takes the value 1 if the receiver is FFF and the sender is SMA, and 0 otherwise. “SM → All”
takes the value 1 if the receiver is SM and the sender is SM, SX or FFF, and 0 otherwise. “SX
→ FFF” takes the value 1 if the receiver is SX and the sender is SM, SX or FFF, and 0 other-
wise. The omitted category is the dummy “FFF → SX” that takes the value 1 if the receiver
is FFF and the sender is SX, and 0 otherwise. “Beauty” ranges from 1 to 6 where 1 stands
for “very ugly” and 6 stands for “very beautiful”. “Friendliness” ranges from 1 to 6 where 1
stands for “very unfriendly” and 6 stands for “very friendly”. “Trustworthiness” ranges from
1 to 6 where 1 stands for “very untrustworthy” and 6 stands for “very trustworthy”. Controls
for the SES of the sender and of the receiver include their gender, age, household income, ed-
ucation, religiosity and whether they know players from previous sessions. Standard errors are
clustered at the sender level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
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Appendix
Appendix A1: Evidence of SM/SX similarity before migration to France
Ethnographic evidence lends support to the fact that families from the Joola and Serer communities who converted to
Christianity in the 19th century were not different from those who converted to Islam during the same period: those who
became Christians rather than Muslims were not characterized by propensities more consistent with the social mobility
of their descendants (and therefore, among those descendants who would migrate to France after WWII, the ability to
assimilate)
The historical record shows that the southwestern part of Senegal that is populated by the Joola and Serer communities
was penetrated by both Muslim jihadists and Christian missionaries in the mid-19th century. Yet, these Joola and Serer
communities resisted conversion from both world religions until the 1950s, when the economic returns to conversion
became more attractive (Asante (2009) and Cannot-Brown (2009)). At that time, conversion to Islam or Christianity
was indeed associated with religious networks allowing individuals to market their crops and access credit (see Gastellu
(1981)). However, the economic returns to converting to one or the other religion were equal. Only the crops targeted
by each religion were different: Muslim jihadists targeted crops they considered as “pure”, thereby leaving the “impure”
(but just as economically rewarding) ones to Christian missionaries. More specifically, while Muslim jihadists encouraged
the development of the groundnut trade, Christian missionaries helped in the development of commerce in palm wine,
an enterprise that was scorned by the Muslims (see Linares (1992)). In fact, Islam and Christianity implicitly shared the
market for the two crops that, in this southwestern part of Senegal, were easiest to cultivate.
The ethnographic evidence suggests that the different integration patterns between SM and SX migrants in France in the
21st century cannot be accounted for by the fact that their ancestors who converted to Islam and Christianity in the 19th
century were different in terms of propensities toward economic success. Yet, it could be that differences across SM and
SX emerged after conversion, notably with respect to their access to education. Catholic primary schools, because they
benefited from greater support from the French colonial authorities, maybe constituted better stepping stones to higher
education than did madrasa.
The survey that we conducted in 2009 among 511 second- and third-generation SM and SX immigrants to France (see
subsection 2.1. for a description) rules out this possibility (at least for these SM and SX families who migrated to France).
Our survey indeed shows that the first migrants in these SM and SX families are similar in terms of level of education
and occupation in Senegal (i.e., before they migrated to France). As shown in rows 1 and 2 of Table A1, the difference in
the highest level of education completed in Senegal and in the probability to be involved in on-farm rather than off-farm
activities is not statistically significant across SM and SX first migrants. Notably, SM first migrants are not less educated
nor more likely to be involved in on-farm activities in Senegal than are SX first migrants. Moreover, row 3 of Table A1
confirms that SM and SX first migrants arrived at the same time to France (i.e., in the 1970s). At that time, droughts
in Senegal caused an agrarian crisis, and with relatively open borders to the former metropole considerable numbers of
Serers and Joolas migrated, mostly to take jobs in the labor-hungry industrial suburbs of France’s major cities.
Table A1: Education, occupation, and number of years since arrival to France of the first migrants in SM and SX
families. Difference of means analysis.
SX SM Difference
(a) (b) (b)-(a)
(1) Highest level of education completed in Senegal (from 1 to 6)
3.160 2.861 -0.300
(N=106) (N=259) (N=365)
(2) Occupation in Senegal: =1 if involved in on-farm activities, =0 if... 0.667 0.535 0.132
... involved in off-farm activities (N=18) (N=71) (N=89)
(3) Number of years since arrival to France
39.053 39.429 0.376
(N=94) (N=233) (N=327)
Notes: Columns 1 and 2 report the mean value for SX and SM respectively. Column 3 reports the difference between the mean
values in columns 1 and 2. The highest level of education completed in Senegal (row 1) is coded as follows: 1 if “no schooling”, 2 if
“primary or some primary”, 3 if “vocational degree”, 4 if “some secondary”, 5 if “completed secondary” and 6 if “post-secondary”.
*, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
Appendix A2: Description of the 2009 speed chatting game, voting game, dictator game
and strategic dictator game
The 2009 speed chatting game
The 2009 speed chatting game followed the simultaneous trust game. For this game, our ten players were placed into
two teams of 5, each following the same protocol. Each player on a team was instructed that he/she would have a few
minutes to meet (and we emphasized, to get to know) each member of the other team, thereby “speed chatting” with five
other players, sequentially, as in a speed-dating situation. After meeting each partner, players were given 1 minute to jot
down notes on a piece of paper. After meeting all members of the other group, each player received a sheet of paper with
the picture of each person he or she had just met, and a series of eight personal questions about them (their age, their
religion, their job, whether they had obtained their Baccalaure´at (the French high-school diploma), the country in which
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they were born, the district in which they live, whether they are married and their favorite hobby). Players were allowed
to consult their notes. For each question, subjects provided their answer, or selected “don’t know”, and indicated whether
they learned this information from their chat, or simply guessed the answer. For each correct answer, subjects earned 1
euro.1 Finally, players were asked to report any additional information they had learned about their interlocutor, as well
as whether they believed they could be friends with this interlocutor and recommend this interlocutor to an employer.
Figure A2-a illustrates a sample sheet for the speed chatting game.
Figure A2-a: Sample sheet of the 2009 speed chatting game.
Translation of Figure A2-a: “1. How old is this person? 2. What is her religion? 3. Is she self-employed? 4. Does she
hold a A-level? 5. What is her country of birth? 6. In which Parisian neighborhood does she live. Indicate “NP” if she
does not live in Paris. 7. Is she married? 8. What is her hobby? [For each of these 10 questions, our players had to
answer the two following questions:] Did you guess or learn this information? On a 1 to 10 scale, indicate how confident
you are in your answer (1 means that you are not confident at all, 10 that you are fully confident).”
The 2009 voting game
The 2009 voting game took place after the speed chatting game. Each player in each of the two teams of five players
formed during the speed chatting game was asked to play two roles, sequentially. First, each player was to be a voter,
i.e. to choose one leader from the other team, knowing that the leader would have the responsibility of dividing 30 euros
between herself and her electorate in any way she wanted (including keeping it all to herself). Each voter received a
hand-out with the pictures of each of the five candidates she was to rank in order of preference for the role of leader.
Second, each player was to imagine herself the leader: on a separate hand-out, each player had to indicate how much she
would allocate to each of the members of her electorate, were she to be elected the leader. The player with the highest
ranking in votes in each team became the leader, and her allocations were distributed between herself and the members
of the other team.
The voting game was meant to measure taste-based discrimination and/or statistical discrimination after the speed-
chatting socialization phase. Clearly, the decision of the voter to rank member i of the other team first can be motivated
by unconditional altruism toward i (i.e.: the willingness to increase the chance for i of being elected and of getting 30
euros no matter how i might allocate the award). It can also be motivated by trust, which is the belief that i is most likely
to return a larger share of her 30 euros to her electorate, or to certain members of her electorate. Similarly, the decision
of the leader to allocate a strictly positive amount to member i of the other team can also be motivated by unconditional
altruism toward i (i.e.: the willingness to increase i’s payoff irrespective of i’s electoral choice). It can also be motivated
by belief-based reciprocal altruism, that is the willingness to reward i based on the belief that i voted for the leader.
The 2009 dictator game
After the voting game, subjects were ushered into a single room to play a dictator game.2 All players were shown the
same set of six partners (whom we call recipients) on a large screen revealing only their faces and ascribed first names,
1Subjects were told that the 1-euro award was independent of whether they learned the information from their chat or guessed it.
2In this classic experimental game introduced by Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1986), players view pictures of people whom they have
never met and are given money either to keep for themselves or to share with the person (the “recipient”) whose picture they are viewing
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which we strategically altered as is commonly done in correspondence tests conducted by economists (see Bertrand and
Mullainathan (2004)). More precisely, among the six recipients, two were apparent FFF with Christian names, two were
ambiguous with alternatively Muslim and Christian names, such that players could reasonably think they were FFF with
Christian names or North Africans with Muslim names, and two were apparent black Africans. For half of the sessions,
subjects viewed one of the ambiguous recipients and one of the Senegalese recipients with a Christian name, and the other
ambiguous recipient as well as the other Senegalese recipient with a Muslim name; for the other half of the sessions, this
was reversed. By doing so, we avoid any confound between the ethnic type of the recipient and the face of the recipient.
Put differently, the fact that donors see the same Senegalese face with alternated religious identities (one Christian, the
other Muslim) allows us to run a within-face analysis. Figure A2-b illustrates the faces and alternating names of our
recipients in the dictator game.
It is important to note that the four non-Senegalese recipients were recruited from the 19th district of Paris in a similar
way as the 2009 players (while the Senegalese recipients, in order to assure ourselves that they would not be recognized by
our Senegalese donors, were not residents of Ile de France). None of the recipients ever participated in our game sessions,
and none was ever known personally by any of the donors.
The donors saw the sequence of recipients only once and were asked to make a decision to allocate a = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5}
euros to each recipient – out of 5 euros allotted to them each time, being assured that the amounts accruing to each
recipient would actually be transferred to them. Given that the recipient has no say in the dictator game, differences in
the dictator’s donation to the various recipients is commonly interpreted as differences in unconditional altruism.
At this stage, it is critical to recall the professional norm among experimental economists that proscribes the use of decep-
tion in the lab. Deception indeed compromises the ability of researchers to find participants who trust their experimental
design (see Hertwig and Ortmann (2001) and Jamison, Karlan and Schechter (2008) for evidence that deception does
affect participants’ future behavior). Institutional review boards (IRBs) are the main enforcers of the “no deception”
rule. More precisely, these boards are in charge of attesting that all procedures described in a protocol will be carried out
exactly as stated in the instructions to the subjects and that all allocations of money that will be made in the experiment
will be paid in exactly the amount chosen by the subjects. Our experimental protocol (and notably the section related
to the 2009 dictator game) complies with this requirement and was therefore endorsed by the Stanford IRB. In the 2009
dictator game, we indeed told our subjects that the recipients whose pictures were shown were real people, recruited the
same way as our subjects, which was true. We also assured our subjects that we would transfer to the recipients exactly
the amounts chosen by our subjects, which we did. Finally, we did not say a word about the names of our recipients. We
never claimed that the nature of the recipients’ names was real and therefore did not deceive our subjects.3
Figure A2-b: Variations in the ethno-religious identity of the recipients in the 2009 dictator game.
The 2009 strategic dictator game
The 2009 strategic dictator game immediately followed the 2009 dictator game. The strategic dictator game consisted in
asking players to guess the amount allocated to each of the dictator game recipients by one of the session’s FFF players
(although, so as not to prime players to the ethnicity of the FFF model, we did not advertize that this model would
specifically be FFF). Players were also told that the player who guessed closest to the actual decisions of this FFF model
would receive a prize of 30 euros. Moreover, they were informed that, in case of a tie, all subjects who made the closest
guess would receive this prize.4 The strategic dictator game therefore helps us determine the beliefs of our 2009 players
about FFF generosity toward the various recipients in the 2009 dictator game.
(being assured that the amounts accruing to each recipient will actually be transferred to them). There is no penalty for keeping the entire
amount, and no one can influence the players’ donations: they are therefore, effectively, “dictators”.
3Here is the way the 2009 dictator game was introduced to the subjects: “We are going to play one last game. In this game, we are
projecting pictures of individuals on the wall. You will see a total of six pictures, sequentially. For each face, we will give you 5 euros. You are
to decide how much of these 5 euros (0, 1, 2, 3, 4 or all of it, 5) you wish to give to the individual in the picture. Let me emphasize that these
individuals whose pictures are projected are real individuals. They were recruited by our teams the same way you were. We will contact them
again after the experiment to give them the amount of money that you decided to give them. Keep in mind however that these individuals
will never know who you are or how much you will have given them. Your decision is therefore entirely private. Do you have any questions?”.
4This reward scheme is incentive compatible provided the 10 subjects cannot coordinate on a random value between 0 and 5. Given that
subjects were not allowed to talk to each other, this condition was satisfied. As an illustration, two of our ten subjects made the same closest
guess in only 1 of our 8 game sessions.
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Appendix A3: Analysis of FFF guesses in the 2010 strategic dictator game
In the 2010 strategic dictator game, the 50 FFF players were shown, sequentially, photographs of some of our 2009 players.
Underneath the photograph, they were also shown photographs of the six recipients from the 2009 dictator game. FFF
players were asked to guess the donation of the pictured 2009 dictator to each of the six recipients. Players received 50
centimes for each correct answer.5 Figure A3 illustrates a sample screenshot of the 2010 strategic dictator game.
Figure A3: Sample screenshot of the 2010 strategic dictator game.
Translation of Figure A3: “How many euros do you think Ousmane gave to these people?”
Two versions of the game were prepared, but only one of them (randomly chosen) was selected for each game session.
The same Senegalese dictator was ascribed a Muslim name in one version and a Christian name in the other. This allows
us to run a within-dictator analysis (i.e.: to control for the face of the dictator) when we compare FFF guesses about SM
dictator donations to FFF recipients with FFF guesses about SX dictator donations to FFF recipients.
This comparison enables us to determine whether FFF expect SM to show lower levels (as compared to SX) of unconditional
altruism toward FFF recipients before socialization (our 2010 FFF players were indeed not aware that a speed chatting
game had occurred before the 2009 dictator game).
We estimate the following equation over the set of triads composed of FFF guessers, SM and SX dictators and FFF
recipients:
y = a+ b.(FFF SM → FFF) + c′.X+ d′.Z+ e′.H+ f ′.Π+ ǫ,
where y refers to FFF guesses about SM or SX donation (or unconditional altruism) to FFF recipients. The dummy
(FFF  SM → FFF) is equal to 1 if the guesser is FFF, the dictator is SM and the recipient is FFF and to 0 if the
guesser is FFF, the dictator is SX and the recipient is FFF. As a consequence, coefficient b captures the difference between
FFF guesses about SM dictators’ donations to FFF recipients and FFF guesses about SX dictators’ donations to FFF
recipients. We control for a series of socioeconomic characteristics of FFF guessers (gender, age, education, household
income and religiosity) that are denoted by X. Additionally, in order to run a within-face analysis, we introduce Z and H,
two vectors of face fixed effects for the dictator and the recipient respectively. Finally, we introduce Π, a vector of session
fixed effects. Note that standard errors are clustered at the guesser level since guesses from the same guesser cannot be
considered independent of one another.
Table A3 presents OLS estimates from three model specifications. In column 1, we control for the dummy (FFF SM →
FFF) only. In column 2, we add dictator- and recipient- face fixed effects as well as session fixed effects. In column 3, we
include the socio-demographic characteristics of the guesser. The non significant coefficient in row (1) in all three columns
shows that guesses of the 2010 FFF players about the donation of SM and SX dictators to FFF recipients do not differ.
5In cases where FFF had to guess donation amounts for player match-ups that never actually occurred in 2009, they were automatically
given 25 centimes.
56
Table A3: Guesses of FFF players in the 2010 strategic dictator game. OLS analysis.
Dep. var.: Guesses of FFF players
(1) (2) (3)
(1) FFF  SM → FFF -0.013 -0.000 -0.008
(0.068) (0.064) (0.066)
SES of the guesser
(2) Female -0.289
(0.184)
(3) Age -0.001
(0.007)
(4) Household income -0.004
(0.040)
(5) Education 0.201***
(0.034)
(6) Religiosity 0.249***
(0.065)
Session fixed effects No Yes Yes
Dictator face fixed effects No Yes Yes
Recipient face fixed effects No Yes Yes
R2 0.000 0.138 0.400
Observations 600 600 576
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is a triad
formed by a FFF guesser, a SM or SX dictator and a FFF recipient. The de-
pendent variable ranges from 0 (the guesser guesses that the donor gives noth-
ing to the recipient) to 5 (the guesser guesses that the donor gives her total en-
dowment to the recipient). “FFF  SM→FFF” takes the value 1 if the guesser
is FFF, the dictator is SM and the recipient is FFF and 0 if the guesser is FFF,
the dictator is SX and the recipient is FFF. “Female” takes the value 1 if the
FFF guesser is male and 0 otherwise. “Age” is equal to the age of the FFF
guesser. “Education” ranges from 1 (less than primary school completed) to
10 (higher than college degree completed). “Household income” ranges from 1
(less than 500 euros monthly) to 11 (more than 7,500 euros monthly). “Reli-
giosity” ranges from 1 (never attends religious services) to 7 (attends religious
services several times a week). Standard errors are clustered at the FFF guesser
level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
Appendix A4: Analysis of FFF guesses in the 2010 double strategic dictator game
In the 2010 strategic dictator game, the 50 FFF players were shown the photographs of two of our 2009 Senegalese female
players, as well as of two of our 2009 FFF female dictators. Underneath these photographs, they were also shown the
photographs of the six recipients from the 2009 dictator game. Our 2010 FFF players were asked to guess the guesses of
the 2009 Senegalese female players during the 2009 strategic dictator game about the amount that the 2009 FFF dictators
had transferred to each of the six recipients from the 2009 dictator game. Players received 50 centimes for each correct
answer.6 Figure A4 illustrates a sample screenshot of the 2010 double strategic dictator game.
6In cases where FFF had to guess donation amounts for player match-ups that never actually occurred in 2009, they were automatically
given 25 centimes.
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Figure A4: Sample screenshot of the double 2010 strategic dictator game.
Translation of Figure A4: “Monique has guessed Simone’s donations. What do you think is Monique’s guess for each of
the individuals below?”
Two versions of the game were prepared but only one of them (randomly chosen) was selected for each game session. In
order to run a within-Senegalese player analysis (i.e., to control for the face of this player), the same 2009 Senegalese
player was ascribed the Muslim first name “Aicha” in one version, and the Christian first name “Monique” in the other.
The 2010 double strategic dictator game allows us to determine whether FFF hold different second-order beliefs about
SM and SX, that is whether they expect SM beliefs about FFF unconditional altruism toward SM to be more pessimistic
than SX beliefs about FFF unconditional altruism toward SX.
We estimate the following equation over the set of quatuors composed of a FFF guesser, a SM or SX player, a FFF
dictator and a SM or SX recipient:
y = a+ b.(FFF SM FFF → SM) + c′.X+ d′.Z+ e′.H+ f ′.J+ g′.Π+ ǫ,
where y refers to FFF guesses on SM or SX players’ guesses on FFF dictators’ donations to SM or SX recipients. The
dummy (FFF  SM  FFF → SM) is equal to 1 if the guesser is FFF, the player is SM, the dictator is FFF and
the recipient is SM and 0 if the guesser is FFF, the player is SX, the dictator is FFF and the recipient is SX. As a
consequence, coefficient b captures the difference between FFF guesses about SM guesses on FFF dictators’ donations to
SM recipients and FFF guesses about SX guesses on FFF dictators’ donations to SX recipients. We control for a series of
socioeconomic characteristics of FFF guessers (gender, age, education, household income and religiosity) that are denoted
by X. Additionally, in order to run a within-face analysis, we introduce Z, H and J, three vectors of face fixed effects for
the player, the dictator and the recipient respectively. Finally, we introduce Π, a vector of session fixed effects. Note that
standard errors are clustered at the guesser level since guesses from the same guesser cannot be considered independent
of one another.
Table A4 presents OLS estimates from three model specifications. In column 1, we control for the dummy (FFF SM 
FFF → SM) only. In column 2, we add player-, dictator- and recipient- face fixed effects as well as session fixed effects.
In column 3, we include the socio-demographic characteristics of the guesser. The non significant coefficient in row (1)
in all three columns shows that guesses of the 2010 FFF players about SM guesses on FFF dictators’ donations to SM
recipients are similar to their guesses about SX guesses on FFF dictators’ donations to SX recipients.
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Table A4: Guesses of FFF players in the 2010 double strategic dictator game. OLS analysis.
Dep. var.: Guesses of FFF players
(1) (2) (3)
(1) FFF  SM  FFF → SM 0.020 -0.002 0.027
(0.132) (0.128) (0.133)
SES of the guesser
(2) Female 0.074
(0.267)
(3) Age 0.006
(0.011)
(4) Household income 0.006
(0.055)
(5) Education 0.179***
(0.057)
(6) Religiosity 0.287***
(0.089)
Session fixed effects No Yes Yes
Senegalese player face fixed effects No Yes Yes
FFF dictator face fixed effects No Yes Yes
Recipient face fixed effects No Yes Yes
R2 0.000 0.177 0.374
Observations 200 200 192
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is a quatuor formed
by a FFF guesser, a SM or SX player, a FFF dictator and a SM or SX recipient. The
dependent variable ranges from 0 (the guesser guesses that the player guesses that the
FFF dictator gives nothing to the recipient) to 5 (the guesser guesses that the player
guesses that the FFF dictator gives her total endowment to the recipient). “FFF  SM
 FFF → SM” takes the value 1 if the guesser is FFF, the player is SM, the dictator is
FFF and the recipient is SM and 0 if the guesser is FFF, the player is SX, the dictator
is FFF and the recipient is SX. “Female” takes the value 1 if the FFF guesser is male
and 0 otherwise. “Age” is equal to the age of the FFF guesser. “Education” ranges from
1 (less than primary school completed) to 10 (higher than college degree completed).
“Household income” ranges from 1 (less than 500 euros monthly) to 11 (more than 7,500
euros monthly). “Religiosity” ranges from 1 (never attends religious services) to 7 (at-
tends religious services several times a week). Standard errors are clustered at the FFF
guesser level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels.
Appendix A5: Analysis of FFF guesses in the 2010 incomes game
In this game, we showed our 2010 FFF players the pictures of the six recipients from the 2009 dictator game with their
ascribed first names and asked them to guess the monthly income of each of these individuals. Half of the FFF players
saw the picture of the Senegalese female recipient and the picture of the Senegalese male recipient with the ascribed first
names “Khadija” and “Michel” respectively, and half saw the picture of the Senegalese female recipient and the picture of
the Senegalese male recipient with the ascribed first names “Jose´phine” and “Aboubacar” respectively. This experimental
set up allows us to test whether, holding the picture of the Senegalese constant, FFF hold different beliefs about SM
versus SX monthly income.
We estimate the following equation over the set of pairs composed of a FFF guesser and a SM or SX recipient:
y = a+ b.(FFF SM) + c′.X+ d′.Z+ e′.Π+ ǫ,
where y refers to FFF guesses about SM or SX monthly income. The dummy (FFF SM) is equal to 1 if the recipient
is SM and to 0 if the recipient is SX. As a consequence, coefficient b captures the difference between FFF guesses about
SM monthly income and FFF guesses about SX monthly income. We control for a series of socioeconomic characteristics
of FFF guessers (gender, age, education, household income and religiosity) that are denoted by X. Additionally, in order
to run a within-face analysis, we introduce Z, a vector of face fixed effects for the recipient. Finally, we introduce Π, a
vector of session fixed effects. Note that standard errors are clustered at the guesser level. As a matter of fact, guesses
stemming from the same guesser cannot be considered independent of one another.
Table A5 presents OLS estimates from three model specifications. In column 1, we control for the dummy (FFF SM)
only. In column 2, we add recipient face fixed effects as well as session fixed effects. In column 3, we include the socio-
demographic characteristics of the guesser. The non significant coefficient in row (1) in all three columns shows that
guesses of the 2010 FFF players about the monthly income of SM and SX recipients do not differ.
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Table A5: FFF beliefs about SM and SX monthly income. OLS analysis.
Dep. var.: Monthly income of the recipient
(1) (2) (3)
(1) FFF  SM 0.020 -0.046 0.017
(0.208) (0.182) (0.188)
(2) Female -0.502**
(0.207)
(3) Age 0.009
(0.017)
(4) Household income 0.128
(0.080)
(5) Education 0.142
(0.093)
(6) Religiosity -0.126*
(0.067)
P-value of the test: (1)=0 0.92 0.80 0.93
Session fixed effects No Yes Yes
Face fixed effects No Yes Yes
R2 0.000 0.322 0.431
Observations 100 100 96
Notes: The table reports OLS estimates. The unit of observation is a dyad formed of
FFF guessers and SM or SX recipients. The dependent variable ranges from 1 (less than
500 euros monthly) to 11 (more than 7,500 euros monthly). “FFF SM” takes the value
1 if the recipient is SM, and 0 if the recipient is SX. “Female” takes the value 1 if the
FFF player is female and 0 otherwise. “Age” is equal to the age of the FFF player. “Ed-
ucation” ranges from 1 (less than primary school completed) to 10 (higher than college
degree completed). “Household income” ranges from 1 (less than 500 euros monthly) to
11 (more than 7,500 euros monthly). “Religiosity” ranges from 1 (never attends religious
services) to 7 (attends religious services several times a week). Standard errors are clus-
tered at the FFF guesser level. *, ** and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1%
levels.
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